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EDITORIAL
Since I presented the Commission’s autumn 
economic forecasts about two months ago, 
the economic context has evolved 
considerably. Oil prices reached all-time 
highs in October before easing again 
significantly, while the euro has continued 
to appreciate against the dollar. 
Disappointing third-quarter growth in 
France and Germany, which account for 
half of the euro-area economy, has attracted 
considerable attention. In addition, business 
confidence has recently shown some signs 
of softening. 
Those seeking reassurance that the upturn 
in the euro area is now firmly established 
will be disappointed by some of the most 
recent developments. Nevertheless, while 
the easing of growth momentum in the 
second half of 2004 suggests that downside 
risks have not abated, the autumn economic 
forecasts’ basic scenario of growth in the 
euro area of about 2% this year and next 
still stands, since it already largely took 
account of most of the negative forces that 
have recently been at play. Moreover, some 
developments were compensated by others. 
For example, although the euro has 
appreciated above the technical assumptions 
on which our growth projections were 
based, oil prices are now actually 
significantly below the level assumed for 
2005. 
While third quarter growth developments 
may appear worrisome, they should be also 
put into proper perspective. Firstly, growth 
was only marginally lower than projected in 
our autumn forecasts. Secondly, the 
slowdown comes against the background of 
more favourable than expected economic 
developments in the first half of the year. 
Thirdly, economic activity did not decelerate 
everywhere in the euro area; indeed it even 
strengthened in several countries. Finally, 
changes in third quarter growth were 
dominated by changes in the two most 
volatile components of demand – trade and 
inventories – and should therefore be 
interpreted with particular caution. 
The key to a sustained recovery in the euro 
area continues to be a recovery in domestic 
demand, and while domestic spending has 
so far failed to shift up a gear, it did register 
a further, albeit slight, acceleration in the 
third quarter.  
Meanwhile, the appreciation of the euro 
against the dollar, striking though it may be, 
should not be taken at face value. What we 
have seen over the last 18 months in the 
exchange market is the result of the general 
weakness of the dollar, rather than any 
particular strength of the euro. This is 
different from the period between early 
2002 and mid-2003 where the strengthening 
of the euro not only reflected the weakening 
of the dollar but also its own broad recovery 
from the exceptionally low levels that it had 
reached against all major currencies. This 
means that, although euro-area exporters 
have had to cope with a significant 
deterioration of competitiveness over the 
last three years, it is mostly the gains 
registered in the early years of EMU that 
have been lost. Measured on the basis of 
unit labour costs, the euro-area’s real 
effective exchange rate is now just above its 
long-term average. In other words, the euro 
is strong but its level is not substantially out 
of line with fundamentals.  
The euro appreciation has played a part in 
cushioning the impact of rising (dollar-
denominated) oil prices. However, they 
have still risen by about 25% in euro terms 
since the start of the year, and the associated 
price pressures in the energy sector have 
kept headline inflation above 2% since the 
summer. The broader dampening effect of 
the euro appreciation on consumer price 
inflation is likely to be felt more strongly in 
2005. Thus, although energy-related 
inflationary pressures could keep HICP 
above 2.0% in the first few months of 2005, 
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the strong euro and moderate labour cost 
growth should bring inflation below 2.0% 
again in the second quarter. 
Moving beyond the immediate economic 
context, the focus section of this report 
looks at recent trends in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and the potential impact 
of such flows on the performance of the 
euro-area economy. Over the last 10 years, 
FDI flows have been on an upward trend, 
particularly between euro-area countries, 
where the increase has been significant. This 
suggests a distinct EMU effect on top of the 
broader global trend, as companies have 
sought to take advantage of the increased 
integration of the euro-area economy to 
improve resource allocation and 
productivity.  
FDI flows into the euro area can bring 
benefits in the form of increased 
investment, improved efficiency and 
technological spillovers into the wider 
economy. FDI flows abroad provide the 
opportunity for euro-area companies to 
access foreign markets and for euro-area 
consumers to ultimately benefit from 
cheaper goods. Moreover, there is no 
evidence that such flows are at the expense 
of domestic investment. However, in order 
to fully capture the benefits of FDI, product 
market competition must be strong enough 
to ensure that cost savings are passed on to 
consumers, while labour market policies 
help workers move rapidly into new jobs.  
As a final point I would draw your attention 
to the fact that the recent economic 
developments mentioned above yet again 
underline the need for the euro area to 
strengthen its internal growth forces. The 
report by the High Level Group led by Wim 
Kok has made a valuable analysis of the 
situation and suggested ways to reinvigorate 
the Lisbon Strategy in order to achieve 
more growth and employment. It must now 
be followed up by in-depth discussions 
amongst all the stakeholders with a view to 
building a broader, deeper consensus on the 
Lisbon Strategy itself and the practical 
measures to implement it. The Commission 
will present its own views on how to 
invigorate the Lisbon Strategy early next 
year ahead of the Spring European Council. 
 
Joaquín ALMUNIA 
MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
Recent developments in economic activity in the euro area have been somewhat disappointing. GDP growth came in a tenth of 
percentage point slower than expected in the third quarter with a sharp deterioration of net trade offsetting the fastest inventory 
build-up in the past 10 years. In addition, the latest short-term indicators have been mixed: while business confidence has 
weakened, some hard data were better than expected in October. Due to a maturing trade cycle and competitive pressures from 
the appreciation of the euro, the trade engine is losing some momentum. After strong gains in the early years of EMU, the 
competitiveness of the euro area has deteriorated over the past three years and the real exchange rate is now somewhat above 
its long-term average. In the meantime, domestic demand excluding inventories has so far failed to shift up a gear, registering 
only a slight acceleration in the euro area in the third quarter. However, while private consumption remains sluggish, there 
may be early signs of a pick-up of investment. Overall, recent developments suggest that risks to the short-term growth outlook 
have not abated, particularly since sharp and disorderly exchange rate adjustments may entail export losses. In contrast, 
recent news on inflation is more encouraging. Despite high energy prices, inflation pressures remain relatively muted in the euro 
area thanks to the strong euro and more rapid gains in labour productivity. In addition, inflation differences between Member 
States, which had widened significantly in the first years of EMU, have narrowed substantially over the past two years. 
 
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1  
A more gradual cyclical upswing influenced 
by special factors 
The preliminary national account estimates for 
the third quarter indicate a deceleration in the 
pace of expansion of economic activity in the 
euro area. After having surprised on the upside in 
the first quarter of 2004 and remaining around 
potential in the second quarter, quarter-on-
quarter GDP growth eased from 0.5% in the 
                                                     
1 The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 13 December 2004.  
second quarter to 0.3% in the third. This is a 
tenth of a percentage point slower than projected 
in the Commission’s autumn forecasts. The 
recovery, which started during the summer of 
2003, has lost some momentum. The slowdown 
in GDP growth in the third quarter was due to a 
very sharp contraction in net trade. Domestic 
demand showed strong momentum but this was 
mostly accounted for by the biggest inventory 
build-up in more than 10 years. Excluding 
inventories, domestic spending picked up only 
modestly, from 0.2% in the second quarter to 
0.4% in the third, with strong 
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2003 Q4 
2004 
Q1 
2004 
Q2 
2004 
Q3 
Carryover 
to 2004 2004 (2) 2005 (2) 
 Percentage  change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.3 1.7 2.1 2.0 
Private consumption 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.5 1.7 
Government consumption 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.7 1.5 1.1 
Gross fixed capital formation 1.0 -0.3 0.3 0.6 1.1 2.2 3.2 
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.3 
Exports of goods and services 0.3 1.5 3.1 1.2 5.8 6.7 6.2 
Imports of goods and services 2.0 0.5 2.8 3.2 6.3 6.2 6.5 
 Percentage point contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.9 1.0 
Government consumption 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 
Changes in inventories 0.7 -0.1 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.1 
Net exports -0.6 0.4 0.2 -0.7 0.0 0.3 0.0 
(1) Annual change in %.         (2) European Commission Autumn 2004 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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government consumption explaining a large part 
of the acceleration. 
Much caution should be exercised when 
assessing the third quarter national account data. 
Developments in demand were dominated by 
large changes in the two most volatile (and 
revision-prone) components of demand. In 
addition, the slowdown in economic activity was 
not broadly spread across euro-area Member 
States. Germany and France experienced a 
particularly weak growth rate of just 0.1%. 
Compared with the second-quarter performance, 
this implies a significant downward adjustment, 
of 0.3 and 0.5 percentage points respectively. In 
contrast, Italian growth remained unchanged at 
0.4%, while Spanish economic activity edged 
upwards to 0.6%, from 0.5% in the second. 
Meanwhile, growth in the Netherlands moved 
into positive territory (+0.2%), following the 
marginal contraction in the previous quarter. 
Recent developments in trade are driven by 
both temporary and more lasting forces  
Net trade subtracted 0.7 of a percentage point 
from overall quarter-on-quarter GDP growth in 
the third quarter, whereas it had contributed 0.3 
of a percentage point in the previous two 
quarters.  
The main reason for the negative contribution of 
net trade was the deceleration of export growth 
from 3.1% in the first quarter to 1.2% in the 
third quarter. To a large extent, this reflects the 
negative impact on euro-area foreign demand 
stemming from the softening of global growth 
around the middle of 2004. It may also be the 
result of a technical correction following the very 
strong export growth in the second quarter. In 
addition to these temporary factors, two more 
medium-term forces are gradually and 
increasingly eroding the euro-area’s export 
performance.  
¾ First, there are signs that the world trade 
cycle, while remaining in solid expansion, has 
entered into a more mature phase (see the 
section on the global economy).  
¾ Second, the appreciation of the euro since 
2002 has weighed on external 
competitiveness. The short-term effects of an 
appreciation of the euro on the demand for 
exports are generally estimated to be weak in 
the euro area with most of the impact being 
felt in the medium-term. As a result, the 
lagged effects of the past losses in 
competitiveness are increasingly weighing on 
euro-area exports, translating into a loss in 
export market shares of about 5 percentage 
points in three years (see Graph 1).  
The deterioration of net trade in the third quarter 
was exacerbated by strong import growth at 
3.2%, quarter on quarter. Imports grew very 
rapidly in both the second and third quarters, a 
development which is surprising in light of the 
persistent sluggishness of domestic demand. 
However, as discussed hereafter, it could be a 
positive sign for investment insofar as
Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2003-2004 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI4) Reuters Ser5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 101.0 0.00 2.83 52.29 54.79 95.6 -10.82 29.47 
Trough in latest 
downturn 75.9 -2.68 -0.65 42.9 52.6 84.1 -26.5 -14.1 
January 2004 98.5 0.15 6.27 52.5 57.3 102.8 -5.6 72.9 
February 2004 98.9 0.01 6.06 52.5 56.2 100.2 -6.8 69.9 
March 2004 98.9 -0.06 5.85 53.3 54.4 98.8 -4.1 57.6 
April 2004 100.1 0.38 5.11 54.0 54.5 97.7 -0.5 49.7 
May 2004 100.1 0.28 4.47 54.7 55.8 97.7 -2.5 46.4 
June 2004 99.7 0.42 3.65 54.4 55.3 96.0 -2.0 47.4 
July 2004 99.8 0.56 3.04 54.7 55.3 97.1 4.1 48.4 
August 2004 100.9 0.51 2.69 53.9 54.5 95.9 -2.1 45.3 
September 2004 101.0 0.49 2.62 53.1 53.3 95.7 -1.1 38.4 
October 2004 101.3 0.51 2.45 52.4 53.5 95.9 -0.5 31.9 
November 2004 100.8 0.39  50.4 52.6 94.3 -6.6 13.9 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator, six 
monthly change. 4) Reuters PMI, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Services index. 6) Business expectations, West Germany. 7)  National 
Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) Business expectations of financial market analysts, Germany. 
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the increase in imports was partly driven by 
investment goods.  
Graph 1: Export market shares, euro area 
(annual data – index 1999 = 100) 
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(1) Weighted sum of the imports into the various destination 
markets for total euro-area exports (weighted according to their 
share of euro-area's exports). 
(2) Index for exports divided by the index of the strength of the 
destination markets. 
Source: Commission services. 
There are only limited signs of a pick-up in 
domestic demand  
Following a surprising growth rate of 0.6% in the 
first quarter of the year, euro-area consumer 
spending eased to 0.2% growth in the second 
and third quarters of 2004. Factors behind this 
poor performance include persistent pressures 
on household purchasing power from inflation 
above 2% and the unchanged labour market 
situation.  
The unaltered pace of household spending 
growth between the second and the third quarter 
is likely to lead to an underestimation of the 
current underlying strength of private 
consumption in the euro area. In fact, household 
spending was “abnormally” strong in some 
Member States in the first quarter of 2004, thus 
implying a technical correction in later quarters. 
Consumption growth in the first quarter was 
boosted by a particularly strong rise in France 
and Italy, where it recorded quarter-on-quarter 
growth rates of 1.0% and 1.1%, respectively. 
Household spending was inflated by strong 
discounting in winter sales in a number of 
countries and, in the case of France, also by an 
unexpected drop in the personal savings rate.  
However, the current short-term dynamics of 
private consumption remain anaemic and 
unsatisfactory for a sustained recovery of the 
euro-area economy. In a number of countries, 
consumers are very cautious in their spending, as 
the continuing lack of clear improvement in the 
labour market has sustained their concerns over 
unemployment and personal finances. 
Employment in the euro area has increased only 
very modestly since the beginning of the 
recovery in activity and recent indicators do not 
suggest a rapid pick-up in the last months of the 
year. For instance, according to the Commission 
Business Surveys, companies’ assessment of 
employment conditions in the service sector has 
improved only slightly since the summer. The 
unemployment rate, currently at 8.9%, has been 
stable since April of this year.  
Graph 2: Consumer confidence, euro area 
(Jan 2000 to Nov 2004)  
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Source: Commission services. 
Consumer confidence rose marginally from mid-
2004 onwards, but expectations of consumers 
with regard to their financial situation and 
unemployment have remained broadly 
unchanged during the course of 2004. Finally, 
and on a slightly more optimistic note, retail sales 
recorded a significant increase in October after 
three months of contraction and bank lending 
and consumer lending by banks showed an 
acceleration over the summer.   
The latest news is more positive on the 
investment side. After having contracted slightly 
in the first quarter and posted only a moderate 
0.3% growth in the second quarter, gross fixed 
capital formation in the euro area edged up to 
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0.6% in the third quarter. With the exception of 
the fourth quarter of 2003, when the surge in 
capital spending was driven by special 
developments in some Member States, the third 
quarter figure represents the strongest growth in 
investment since late 2000.  
Moreover, this figure is likely to underestimate 
the acceleration of capital spending in the euro 
area. One indication of this is provided by the 
composition of imports which, as already 
mentioned were, surprisingly strong in the third 
quarter. A breakdown of imports by component 
is not yet available at the euro-area level. 
However, country data suggests that the surge of 
imports was driven by investment goods in some 
Member States such as Spain, Belgium and, to a 
lesser degree, France and Italy. In contrast, the 
growth rate of imports in consumer goods was 
negative in a number of euro-area countries and 
subdued for the region as a whole.  
Graph 3: Imports of capital goods and investment,  
euro area (q-o-q changes in % – 1999Q1 to 2004Q2) 
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04
-9
-7
-5
-3
-1
1
3
5
7
Investment in equipment Imports of capital goods (rhs)
 
Source: Commission services. 
Historical evidence indicates that imported 
capital goods tend to lead actual investment 
(Graph 3). Moreover, although the inventory 
position typically includes errors and omissions 
from various demand sources, the strong imports 
of capital goods in some Member States suggest 
that a large part of the strong inventory build-up 
in the third quarter is likely to mask delayed 
investment still recorded as inventories. The fact 
that, according to the Commission 
manufacturing survey, the stock of finished 
products is not judged to be excessive compared 
to normal levels also supports the above 
conclusion (Graph 4).  
All in all, there is some evidence, although not 
yet in all Member States, of a renewed interest in 
corporate spending, particularly equipment 
investment. This is also backed by a significant 
rise in manufacturing new orders in September. 
If confirmed in the coming quarters, the steady 
acceleration of corporate spending would 
provide encouraging signs of a recovery in 
domestic demand. Caution is, however, needed 
when assessing the short-term outlook for 
investment as the negative implications of the 
renewed appreciation of the euro for corporate 
investment is difficult to evaluate at this stage.  
Graph 4: Inventories, euro area 
(2000Q1 to 2004Q2) 
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(1) Assessment of inventories in ECFIN’s manufacturing survey 
(quarterly averages, normalised) – inverted scale.  
(2) Nominal change in inventories as a share of GDP in %. 
Source: Commission services. 
Leading indicators point to soft growth in Q4 
and continued downside risks  
Confidence indicators point to a deterioration of 
business sentiment in the manufacturing sector 
and, to a lesser degree, in the service sector.  
Manufacturing, which accounts for around a fifth 
of the euro-area’s total value added, displayed 
some signs of weakness in the third quarter. 
After four successive quarters of solid growth, 
value added in industry (as measured in quarterly 
accounts) was nearly flat. Manufacturing 
production indices have also shown a loss of 
momentum over the summer although they 
picked up somewhat again in September (for the 
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euro area as a whole) and surprised on the upside 
in October (most notably in Germany and 
France).  
Looking forward, soft growth in the industrial 
sector is likely in the months to come. DG 
ECFIN’s Business Climate Indicator for the euro 
area fell in November after having moved 
sideways in the previous three months. The 
decrease was driven by a weakening of most 
components of the indicator, i.e. production 
trend in the recent past, total and export order 
books, and stocks of finished products. On a 
more positive tone, production expectations 
remained unchanged. Reuters PMI for the euro 
area has been sending worrying signals for 
several months now. The indicator fell for the 
fourth month in a row in November, bringing 
the headline index very close to the “no-
expansion” area. The weakness was broad-based, 
but particularly significant in the output 
component of the index. 
Graph 5: Business confidence indicators, euro area  
(Jan 2000 to Nov 2004) 
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(1) DG ECFIN’s service confidence indicator (normalised). 
Source: Commission services. 
Activity in the services sector, which accounts for 
about 70% of euro-area value added, continued 
to expand in the third quarter. However, value 
added in the services sector grew by a mere 
0.2%, down from average quarter-on-quarter 
growth of 0.5% in the previous four quarters.  
Looking forward, recent readings from service 
sector indicators have been somewhat 
disappointing. DG ECFIN’s confidence 
indicator for services has been moving sideways 
for most of 2004 and the average level of the 
index in October/November is exactly where it 
was at the end of last year. According to the PMI 
survey, economic activity in the services sector 
fell in November, following a relatively stable 
reading in October. Nevertheless, the overall 
level of the PMI for services is still compatible 
with continuous expansion of economic activity 
in the sector.  
Turning to the short-term prospects for the euro 
area as a whole, DG ECFIN’s indicator-based 
model for quarterly GDP growth in the euro area 
projects a range of 0.2% to 0.6% for GDP 
growth both in the fourth quarter of 2004 and 
the first quarter of 2005 (Graph 6).  
Graph 6: GDP growth, euro area 
(q-o-q changes in % – 2000Q1 to 2005Q1) 
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(1) ECFIN’s indicator based forecast model. 
Source: Commission services. 
Overall, the easing of the growth momentum in 
recent months suggests continued downside risks 
to the scenario presented in the Commission’s 
autumn forecasts of, respectively, 2.1% and 2% 
GDP growth in 2004 and 2005. These downside 
risks are compounded by the possible negative 
impact on exports of a sharp and disorderly 
adjustment in exchange rate markets. However, 
this needs to be balanced with positive news on 
investment side and the fact that some indicators 
have come in better than expected in October 
(retail sales in the euro area, industrial production 
in Germany and France). In addition, world trade 
has lost momentum but remains relatively robust, 
oil prices have recently dropped significantly 
below the level assumed for 2005 in our autumn 
projections and financial conditions are 
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accommodative (see section on monetary and 
financial conditions). Finally, it is worth stressing 
again that recent national account data are 
difficult to interpret. At this stage, it therefore 
appears to be too early to envisage a downward 
revision of the growth forecasts. 
The global economy enters a phase of slower 
growth  
Looking closer into the latest developments in 
the world economy, there are signs that the 
global recovery has entered a phase of somewhat 
slower growth compared to the brisk pace 
recorded early in 2004. According to the latest 
estimates of CPB Netherlands Bureau of 
Economic Policy Analysis, quarter-on-quarter 
world trade growth decelerated from its peak at 
4.3% in the second quarter to 1.9% in the third 
quarter (Graph 7). 
Graph 7: World trade in volume 
(quarterly changes in % – 1999Q2 to 2004 Q3) 
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Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis. 
This goes hand in hand with the most recent 
survey indicators, which also point to a period of 
more moderate growth over the coming months. 
The November reading of the quarterly World 
Economic Survey clearly indicates a deterioration 
of expectations concerning the near-term 
outlook, especially for North America and Asia, 
but also in the euro area. Typical of a relatively 
advanced phase of a global recovery, current 
conditions are still deemed favourable, while 
expectations for the situation six months ahead 
have fallen. Higher oil prices, continued 
withdrawal of monetary stimulus in a number of 
countries (the USA and several emerging market 
economies) and attempts by the Chinese 
authorities to rein in investment in their fast- 
expanding economy are likely to have 
contributed to the observed deceleration. 
Recent developments in the United States. The current 
US expansion completed its third year on a solid 
note. Annualised real GDP growth in the third 
quarter came in at 3.9%, mainly based on strong 
personal consumption expenditure. Personal 
saving fell to the record-low level of 0.5% of 
disposable personal income. In October, 
consumer spending continued to grow solidly 
and the saving rate declined further. The Federal 
Reserve has continued to withdraw monetary 
policy stimulus by raising the federal funds target 
rate to 2.25% in December, which is 125 basis 
points above the level in the first half of the year. 
Long-term interest rates have not, however, 
followed suit, resulting in a flattening of the yield 
curve. The fiscal deficit of general government 
remained at 4.4% of GDP in the third quarter. 
Both producer and consumer prices have picked 
up this autumn, not least as a result of higher 
energy prices and the depreciating dollar. In 
October, the overall and core CPI increased 
respectively by 3.2% and 2.0% year-on-year. The 
current account deficit (in the national accounts 
definition) remained unchanged at 5.4% of GDP 
in the third quarter. The unemployment rate has 
been stable at 5.4-5.5% in the July-November 
period, while the three-month moving average of 
non-farm payroll growth stood at 178 000 in 
November which is close to its 1.7% annualized 
trend rate since the beginning of the year. 
Productivity growth in the non-farm business 
sector has decelerated to 1.8% at an annual rate 
in the third quarter. Most forecasts for the US 
economy project a deceleration of the expansion 
in 2005. Early signs of an impending slowdown 
may be the steady decline in the index of leading 
economic indicators over the five months to 
October and the decline in consumer confidence 
over the four months to November.  
Recent developments in Japan. Economic growth in 
Japan was almost flat in the second and third 
quarters of 2004, a sharp deceleration from the 
rapid pace recorded in the first quarter of the 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 11 - 
year.2 This cyclical downturn is likely to be 
relatively short-lived as growth has been 
negatively affected by temporary factors such as 
the soft patch in the US and the unusually large 
number of typhoons and earthquakes. Given the 
good progress in corporate restructuring and the 
improvement in the banking sector, growth 
should start to pick up to around potential once 
the impact of these temporary factors has faded.  
The year-on-year fall in core CPI (excluding fresh 
food) is currently very close to zero and, if the 
economy continues to expand at the projected 
pace, deflation could come to an end in 2005. 
The Bank of Japan has committed itself to 
maintaining its current quantitative easing 
framework until the year-on-year change in core 
CPI is above zero and is projected to remain 
positive.  
Recent developments in other parts of the world. In the 
rest of the world, GDP growth has been strong 
in 2004. In Latin America, growth is likely to be 
close to 5%, supported by high commodity 
prices, a return of investor confidence and still 
competitive exchange rates (despite the recent 
appreciation of some currencies). Asian 
economies continue to grow at a healthy pace. In 
China, GDP growth is expected to reach about 
9% in 2004. After growing by 9.7% in the first 
half of the year, raising concerns about over-
heating in some sectors, the economy now 
appears to have decelerated somewhat and to be 
moving towards a more balanced growth path. 
Measures taken earlier in the year to rein in 
investment in some sectors seem to have had an 
effect. The growth composition seems healthier, 
with net exports and private consumption 
growth remaining very robust and investment 
spending cooling down somewhat. 
                                                     
2  The Japanese authorities recently changed their national 
accounts methodology, resulting in a downward revision 
of real GDP growth (by slightly more than 1 percentage 
point year-on-year in 2003 and in the first three quarters 
of 2004) and a corresponding upward revision of the 
GDP deflator. 
Monetary and financial conditions remain 
accommodative despite a stronger euro 
Monetary and financial conditions have remained 
accommodative over the last months. However, 
with stable real short-term interest rates – that 
are still close to zero and at historically low levels 
– monetary conditions have become slightly 
tighter due to the rapid appreciation of the euro 
exchange rate since October (see Graph 8 and 
Box 1). In the meantime, however, long-term 
financial conditions have improved on the back 
of rising equity and bond prices.  
Graph 8: Monetary conditions, euro area  
(Jan 1999 to Oct 2004 – index Jan 99 = 0) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The accommodative monetary and financial 
stance seems to have worked its way into the 
financial system. In October, loans to the private 
sector rose by 6.8% year-on-year, after increasing 
by 6.5% in September. The annual change in M3 
came in at 5.8% in October, lower than in 
September (6.0%) but still exceeding the ECB’s 
reference value of 4.5% for the 40th consecutive 
month. Furthermore, loans for house purchases 
increased further to 9.8% from 9% in the second 
quarter of 2004. 
There has been a decoupling of trends in the 
USA and the euro area in government bond 
markets. In the euro area, nominal bond yields 
have been on a general decreasing trend since 
early summer. Reflecting the market’s less 
positive assessment of economic growth due to 
oil prices and the recent exchange rate 
developments, bond yields declined from around  
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Box 1: Recent developments in the euro exchange rate  
 
By December 13th, the euro exchange rate was at about $1.33, which is slightly lower than the historical high of close 
to $1.35 reached earlier in the month. In bilateral terms, the euro is now more than 10% above its end-August level 
and around 17% above its 2003 average. For 2004 as a whole (based on data to mid-December), the euro has on 
average appreciated by almost 9% against the dollar compared to its 2003 average. Because the euro appreciation is 
essentially the consequence of a broad-based weakening of the dollar, gains by the euro against other currencies have 
so far tended to be much less accentuated. For 2004 as a whole (based on data to mid-December), the euro had, on 
average, gained some 2.4% against the Japanese yen compared to 2003 and it had even lost some 2.1% against the 
pound sterling.  
These movements are also reflected in the fact that, in nominal effective terms the euro stood, by December 13th, 
3.8% higher than its end-August level (against 41 countries, including Russia and China). This was 6.5 percent higher 
than the average level of 2003. Over the first 11 months of 2004, the nominal effective exchange rate appreciated on 
average by 3.6 percent against its average level of 2003. 
 
The euro exchange rate (1 Jan 2003 to 13 Dec 2004) 
 
Bilateral exchange rates against USD and Yen Nominal effective exchange rate against 41 countries 
(index 1 Jan 2003 = 100) 
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Source: Datastream and Commission services. 
 
The recent weakness of the dollar largely reflects financial markets’ concerns about the sustainability of the 
historically high US current account deficit, although other factors, including high oil prices and tensions in the 
Middle East, are also likely to have played a role. With the US current account deficit now running at an annual rate 
of more than 5% of GDP, the US is absorbing nearly two-thirds of the net capital outflows of all countries with 
current account surpluses. Whilst the counterpart imbalances to the US external deficit of the mid-1980s were largely 
found in other industrialised economies, today China accounts for about 25% of the total US trade deficit, with other 
non-industrialised East Asian countries accounting for a further 5%.  
Concerns about how long the USA can continue as both the world’s largest borrower and the world’s largest debtor 
are not new. But unlike the situation in the late 1990s, when the current account deficit reflected high levels of 
investment in the US, at present it is seen as the counterpart of high consumption by US citizens (net savings as a 
percentage of gross national income has fallen from 6 percent in 1999 to around 1 percent today) and a sharp 
increase in government borrowing following the turnaround in the government’s fiscal position since 2000. 
Moreover, in the mid-1980s, when the US last had a problem of “twin deficits”, the reduction in the current account 
deficit – then around 3 percent of GDP – was accompanied by a decline of around 30 percent in the broad dollar 
index in real terms. The real broad dollar index has fallen by only 15 percent since early 2002 and 5% since 2000 
while the US external deficit is nearing 6 percent of GDP.  
 
The way the US current account deficit is being financed also differs from that of the late 1990s, with foreign central 
bank purchases of US treasury securities playing a more important role than previously. This particular pattern of 
financing of the US external deficit is the counterpart of the fact that a number of countries, led by China, are 
pursuing fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rates against the dollar at substantially undervalued levels, and are supporting 
these pegs through continuous and substantial foreign exchange intervention. 
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4% at the beginning of October to about 3.7% 
by December 13th. In the USA, the ten-year 
government bond yield decreased in October. It 
then increased from 4.0% at the end of October 
to 4.4% early December before easing again to 
about 4.2% by December 13th. Overall, the 
spread between euro-area and US bond yields 
has widened significantly since the beginning of 
November, a development which can be 
attributed to a change in markets’ perception of 
the growth outlook and the future steps of 
monetary policy. For the euro area, financial 
markets still seem to trade the scenario that the 
oil price hikes will mainly affect economic 
growth but not inflation, the probability of which 
has been reinforced by the recent euro 
appreciation. For the USA, the positive data 
releases in recent weeks have strengthened the 
picture for continued strong growth and the 
expectation of a further interest rate hike by the 
Fed.  
Graph 9: 10-year Government bond yields, euro area 
and USA (1 Jan 2003 to 13 Dec 2004 – in %) 
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Source: Datastream and Commission services. 
Equity markets seem to be trading the same 
positive scenario for the USA as bond markets, 
as indicated by the rise of the Nasdaq and the 
Dow Jones by around 13% and 6% respectively 
since end-September. On the other hand, stock 
market indices in the euro area increased by 
some 7% in the same period despite the rather 
moderate outlook for growth. Compared to their 
2003 average levels, the Dow Jones index had 
gained some 18%, the Nasdaq some 31% and the 
EURO STOXX some 21% by 13 December.  
Graph 10: Stock indices, euro area and USA (1) 
(daily data – 01/01/03 to 13/12/04) 
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(1) Index 01/01/2003 = 100 
Source: Datastream. 
At this juncture it is striking that there is a 
decoupling of trends in the US and the euro area 
in bond markets but not in equity markets. It 
seems as if there is a mismatch in financial 
markets’ expectations about future growth: in the 
euro area a pessimistic scenario in bond markets, 
resulting in low bond yields, and a benign 
scenario in equity markets, where the upward 
revision of corporate earnings expectations led to 
higher stock prices.  
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2. Price and cost competitiveness in the 
euro area and its Member States 
The strong appreciation of the euro on foreign 
exchange markets in recent years has affected the 
external competitiveness of firms in the euro 
area. This section gives a short analysis of recent 
trends in price and cost competitiveness in the 
euro area and its Member States based on the 
developments of real effective exchange rates 
(REER) since the start of the current 
appreciation period.3 It updates the analysis of 
the Focus Section in the Quarterly Report on the 
Euro Area No. 3 2002 and presents recently 
implemented improvements to ECFIN’s 
indicators of price and cost competitiveness. 
The euro has appreciated significantly since 
the beginning of 2002… 
The euro exchange rate depreciated from the 
start of Stage Three of EMU until the end of 
2000. It remained on a low level throughout 2001 
and started appreciating in early 2002. This 
pattern holds when looking both at the euro’s 
value in US dollar and, by and large, at its 
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) 
(Graph 11). 
Graph 11: The euro's nominal effective and bilateral $ 
exchange rates (1999Q1 to 2004Q4) 
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(1) Index 1999=100. 
Source: Commission services. 
                                                     
3 A quarterly overview of data on price and cost 
competitiveness of the EU and its Member States is 
published in DG ECFIN’s report on price and cost 
competitiveness available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publicatio
ns/priceandcostcompetiteveness_en.htm.  
Much of the strengthening of the euro observed 
since 2002 took place until mid-2003. A period 
of relative stability between the third quarter of 
2003 and the third quarter of 2004 was then 
followed by a new phase of appreciation in the 
last months of 2004. Between the third and the 
fourth quarter of 2004, the euro appreciated by 
5.5% against the US dollar and 2.3% in effective 
terms (based on quarterly averages).4 Since the 
beginning of 2002, the euro has appreciated by 
more than 47% against the US dollar but by – a 
considerably smaller – 21% in nominal effective 
terms.  
…leading to a substantial deterioration in 
competitiveness… 
For euro-area exporters, the appreciation of the 
euro has translated into a significant loss in 
competitiveness that more than offset the gains 
registered in 1999/2000. Measures of the REER 
show a deterioration of price and cost 
competitiveness of about 19% since the 
beginning of 2002 (see Boxes 2 and 3 for 
explanations on cost competitiveness measures).  
Graph 12: Euro real effective exchange rate for  
various deflators (1999Q1 to 2004Q4 – index 1999=100) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Put into a more medium-term perspective, the 
euro nominal effective exchange rate is now 
around 14% above its 1995 to 2003 average. The 
difference with the 1995-2003 average is, 
however, significantly smaller in real terms, 
ranging from 4% (unit labour costs) to 6% (GDP 
                                                     
4 Data for the fourth quarter of 2004 is based on the 
technical assumption that all data remain constant at their 
level of 13 December until the end of the year. 
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deflator) and 9% (export price deflator). 
The longer-term picture is similar with the REER 
based on unit labour costs now 3% higher than 
its 1980-2004 average (9% in the case of the 
REER based on the GDP deflator). 
…and a squeezing of exporters’ profit 
margins. 
Graph 13 plots the evolution of unit labour costs 
and export prices (expressed in domestic 
currency) for the euro area over the period 2002 
and 2004. While only a rough proxy, the relative 
slopes of these curves can be seen as an indicator 
of the changes in exporters’ profit margins. 
Throughout 2002 and the first half of 2003, unit 
labour costs increased in the euro area reflecting 
a sharp slowdown of productivity, while 
exporters adjusted their export prices downwards 
very gradually. Since the second half of 2003, 
increases in unit labour costs came to a standstill, 
while export prices started to move up. 
Graph 13: Profit margins of euro-area exporters (1) 
(2002Q1-2004Q4 – index 1999=100) 
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(1) Profit margins are proxied by the difference between unit labour 
cost in the whole economy and the export price deflator. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Box 2: Measuring price and cost competitiveness – some conceptual issues  
 
Several indicators to measure changes in international competitiveness have been developed by DG ECFIN. These 
are indicators of real effective exchange rates (REER) based on cost or price differentials, as other non-price factors 
influencing countries' competitive positions do not lend themselves readily to quantification. In DG ECFIN’s 
quarterly report on “Price and Cost Competitiveness” five different deflators are used to calculate real effective 
exchange rates: consumer prices (CPI and HICP where available), GDP deflators, export prices, unit labour costs in
the economy as a whole and unit wage costs in the manufacturing sector.  
Each of the five indicators comes with advantages and disadvantages. A REER based on export prices may serve as
a useful indicator of a country’s external competitiveness. The export prices based REER can be used to obtain a
comprehensive picture of competition by exporters, but it provides essentially a short-term picture. Export price 
indices tend to be a function of the exchange rate itself. Exporters can “price to market” so that short-run variations 
in the nominal exchange rate are not passed on to the buyers in foreign currency, but are rather allowed to affect the 
export price expressed in domestic currency and thereby profit margins and not external competitiveness.  
REERs based on aggregate price deflators, such as the consumer price index and the GDP deflator, give a more
comprehensive and probably more medium-term picture of price competition of domestic producers. For example,
because a CPI-based REER index reflects the relative prices of tradables and non-tradables at home and abroad, a 
change in this index reflects either a change in competitiveness in the market for tradables and/or an incentive to 
shift resources between the tradable and non-tradables sector. However, this index also includes indirect taxes and,
more importantly, the price of imported goods. 
To measure cost competitiveness, a REER index defined in terms of relative unit labour costs, can be used. Such a
measure compares the relative profitability of non-labour factors producing goods at home and abroad. An 
advantage of a unit labour cost-based REER index is that it does not pick up temporary fluctuations in profit 
margins and thus better reflects competitiveness than REERs based on CPIs, GDP-deflators, export prices, import 
pries and wholesale prices. 
Finally, it is worth bearing in mind that indicators of competitiveness based on broad macroeconomic aggregates 
may conceal important sectoral effects. For instance, excessive rises in labour costs in the non-tradable sector may 
entail a deterioration of the REER based on total ULC or the GDP deflator without any underlying fundamental 
deterioration in the competitiveness of the tradable sector (the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect).  
 
In this article, only three indicators are used to keep the analysis compact. A REER based on unit labour costs of the
total economy as a cost competitiveness indicator, a GDP deflator based REER as an indicator for broad price
competitiveness and an export price based REER as indicator for (external) price competitiveness. 
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The squeeze in profit margins following the euro 
appreciation was broad-based insofar as it can be 
observed in most Member States. Graph 14 
displays the change of relative unit labour costs 
and export prices between the first quarter of 
2002 and the fourth quarter of 2004.  
Graph 14: Change of profit margins of euro-area 
Member States exporters (in % – 2002Q1 to 2004Q4)  
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(1) Change in ULC relative to 33 competing countries. 
Source: Commission services. 
Almost all Member States experienced a stronger 
increase in their relative unit labour costs than in 
their export prices. This is shown by the fact that 
they are located to the right of the 45° line on the 
graph. Only exporters in Germany saw their 
profit margins slightly improving.  
The deterioration of competitiveness differed 
among Member States… 
The strong appreciation of the euro over more 
than two years has left its mark on the 
competitive positions of all euro-area Member 
States. Nevertheless, there are significant 
differences in the magnitude of the deterioration 
of price and cost competitiveness between the 
first quarter of 2002 and the fourth quarter of 
2004. The first column of Panel A in Table 3 
shows the change in the NEER for the Member 
States for this period. The other columns of 
Panel A show: first, the losses in competitiveness 
due to developments in prices (or unit labour 
costs) in the country considered relative to all its 
competitors (intra- and extra-euro-area) and, 
second, the resulting change in the total REER 
(intra and extra-euro-area) when nominal 
exchange rate developments are also taken into 
account. The single currency has eliminated 
currency risks for intra-euro-area  
 
Table 3: Decomposition of the change of the real effective exchange rate of the euro-area Member States  
(change in % between 2002Q1 and 2004Q4) 
 
(A) Total REER  
(against 11 other Member States and the rest of the world) 
(B) Intra-euro-area REER  
(against other 11 Member States) 
 NEER Relative 
change in 
ULC (1) 
REER Relative 
change in 
GDP 
defl.(1) 
REER Relative 
change in 
export 
deflator(1) 
REER Relative 
change in 
ULC (1) 
Relative 
change in 
GDP 
deflat (1) 
Relative 
change in 
export 
deflator(1) 
BLEU 7.8 -1.1 6.6 0.0 7.7 -1.5 6.2 -0.5 0.5 -0.8 
DE 10.8 -6.2 4.0 -3.0 7.5 -2.3 8.3 -6.4 -2.9 -1.4 
EL 8.9 3.8 13.0 2.5 11.6 4.3 13.6 6.0 4.7 5.6 
ES 8.0 4.5 12.9 4.8 13.3 0.2 8.2 5.5 5.8 1.2 
FR 9.8 -0.9 8.8 -1.0  8.7 -1.5 8.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.7 
IE 13.4 2.7 16.5 1.6 15.2 -6.7 5.7 3.6 2.1 -5.9 
IT 10.6 5.3 16.5 2.1 12.9 4.3 15.3 6.8 3.1 5.8 
NL 6.8 0.6 7.5 -0.6 6.1 -0.5 6.2 1.5 -0.1 0.2 
AT 6.2 -0.9 5.3 -2.0 4.0 -0.5 5.6 0.5 -1.3 0.3 
PT 6.3 4.9 11.5 0.3 6.5 -3.4 2.6 5.6 0.7 -2.8 
FI 9.9 -1.4 8.3 -4.5 4.9 -5.8 3.6 -1.1 -4.1 -5.0 
EU12 21.1 -2.0 18.7 -1.5 19.3 -1.9 18.8 --- --- --- 
(1) Change in the ratio of the price or cost index of the country considered to the weighted sum of the price or cost indices of the main 
competitors (double export weight system).  
(2) In the case of EU12, against the rest of the world only. 
Source: Commission services. 
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trade. As a result the appreciation of the REER 
was smaller at the country level than for the euro 
area as a whole. 
Based on labour costs, Italy, Ireland, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal registered the largest losses in 
international cost competitiveness, while Austria, 
Belgium/Luxembourg and, in particular, 
Germany registered only limited losses. 
However, relative changes in the competitiveness 
depend on the real effective exchange rate 
concept used and may differ depending on 
whether one looks at cost or price 
competitiveness. Hence, for Portugal, Ireland 
and Finland, the relative competitive 
performance appears to be much better when 
assessed on the basis of export prices rather than 
labour costs. 
…due to different trade patterns … 
The varying magnitude of the loss in 
competitiveness partly stems from different 
developments of the nominal effective exchange 
rate. The appreciation of the nominal effective 
exchange varied between 6.1% in Austria and 
13.4% in Ireland from the first quarter of 2002 to 
the fourth quarter of 2004 (see Panel A Table 3). 
The difference stems from the different weights 
that non-euro-area countries (in particular the 
US, the UK and Japan) have in the trade patterns 
of euro-area Member States. In Portugal, for 
example, trade to the USA and the UK only 
accounts for less than 15% of all exports5, while 
these two countries account for more than 40% 
of all exports from Ireland. 
…and developments of the price and cost 
deflators… 
In the group of countries with the greatest 
deterioration in price and cost competitiveness, 
Ireland is a special case because much of the 
appreciation of the REER was caused by the 
nominal effective exchange rate, i.e. the country’s 
trade structure. The competitiveness losses in 
Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy were much 
                                                     
5  Measured in double export weights (see Box 3 for an 
explanation of the double weight system). The weights are 
calculated for all 33 trading partners per country. See DG 
ECFIN’s report on “Price and Cost Competitiveness” for 
a complete description of the weights. 
more a reflection of domestic price and cost 
developments.  
At the other end of the range, Germany 
registered the smallest loss in cost 
competitiveness of all the Member States despite 
an unfavourably large share of extra-area trade. 
The nominal effective exchange rate appreciated 
by more than 10% (only Ireland had a sharper 
nominal effective appreciation). This indicates a 
marked decline of the relative cost deflator.  
… driven by different factors. 
A closer look at the underlying factors driving 
developments in cost competitiveness, other than 
trade structure shows that there must be a 
mismatch between wages and productivity in 
countries with a large deterioration in 
competitiveness. A reason for this mismatch 
could be excessive unit labour costs caused by 
overheating and a failure to adjust to lower 
growth. An alternative explanation could be 
productivity shocks and wage rigidities. In some 
countries, partial indexation of wages on prices 
may also have played a role. At this stage, it is 
hard to identify which of these factors have 
driven the deterioration in cost competitiveness 
in Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece.  
Exporters also seem to have pursued different 
pricing strategies as indicated by developments in 
the spread between export prices and unit labour 
costs in different Member States. In Ireland and 
Portugal, the deterioration of cost 
competitiveness since the first quarter of 2002 
did not translate into correspondingly higher 
export prices. This suggests that, by and large, 
exporters in these countries have pursued a 
policy of squeezing their margins in order to 
maintain market share. Obviously, this policy 
cannot be sustained for a long period - unless the 
starting point is one of exceptionally comfortable 
relative margins.6 As regards Germany, the 
comparison of both deflators seems to indicate 
that German exporters have started to rebuild 
profit margins. 
                                                     
6  In the Irish case another possible explanation is the fact 
that a Balassa-Samuelson-type effect took place which led 
to fast growth in unit labour costs in the non-tradable 
sector of the economy, whereas the export sector 
remained productive and competitive. 
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Box 3: Measuring price and cost competitiveness – some practical issues  
A new set of effective exchange rates has been introduced, which were used for the first time in DG ECFIN’s report
on “Price and Cost Competitiveness” for the second quarter of 2004. Changes were made to the group of reference 
countries. The calculations of the nominal and real effective exchange rates within DG ECFIN, which used to be
calculated against 24 countries, are now based on a reference group of 34 or 41 countries, which better represent the 
trade pattern of the euro area.  
1. The group of reference countries 
The calculations were formerly based on a group of 24 industrial countries. These were the 15 EU Member States
plus the US, Japan, Switzerland, Norway, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico and Turkey. In addition, real 
effective exchange rates for the new Member States were calculated separately on the basis of trade with the same
group of 24 countries. This reference group of 24 countries made up for around 58% of extra-EU12 exports. A 
more accurate representation of the euro required the inclusion of the new Member States and important emerging
countries in Asia and Latin America in the calculations of the effective exchange rate of the real trade pattern of the
EU12.  
A new reference group of 41 was therefore constructed. The ten new Member States, the two candidate countries
(Bulgaria and Romania), Russia, China, Brazil, Korea and Hong Kong were added to the original 24. The new group
accounts for around 80% of extra-EU12 exports. The countries in this group were chosen on the basis of their
importance for EU12 exports. This new group now includes the 15 most important export countries, as opposed to
only seven previously.  
Due to data constraints, real effective exchange rates based on unit labour costs cannot be calculated for the broad
group. Therefore, for the time being, only real effective exchange rates calculated to measure price competitiveness will 
be based on this reference group (broad group). Real effective exchange rates calculated to measure cost competitiveness 
will be based on a smaller reference group of 34 countries (the former IC24 group plus the ten new Member States).
For the calculation of the effective exchange rates, the method of double export weights is used. This method 
recognises that the 41 countries compete against each other in their own markets and on all other markets around
the globe. Under this approach, the export competitiveness weight for any country is derived as a combination of
two components: a bilateral export weight, which accounts for direct competition between exporters and domestic
producers in a particular export market; and a third-market export weight, which captures competition between 
exporters from two different countries in a third market. Because USA and Japanese producers have a strong 
presence in many non-EU12 markets (including Latin America and South East Asia), their weight is significantly
higher than indicated by the bilateral trade flows with the EU12. The USA surpasses the UK as the largest 
competitor, and Japan overtakes Switzerland as the third largest. In most other cases, the differences with the
bilateral weights are moderate. China makes a big jump in importance when it comes to double exports. It ranks only 
12th in the share of total exports of EU12 but becomes the fifth main partner in the double export weight ranking. 
 
2. Reference groups of 34 and 41 – some preliminary results 
Between 1999 and 2004 there was hardly any difference between the nominal effective exchange rate of the euro 
against the group of 24 and the other two groups.  
 
In real terms, the difference between the wider groups and the standard measure is slightly bigger. Using the GDP
deflator and the CPI deflator, the appreciation of the euro was stronger against the group of 24 than against the new
groups. This can be explained by the higher inflation in the countries added, dampening the real appreciation of the
euro. In the case of the CPI deflator the difference between the narrow and wider groups is slightly more substantial. 
It is worth noting that there was no difference between the wide and narrow groups in the period between 1999 and
the end of 2000. Overall, the effective exchange rate of the euro against the group of 24 and the group of 41 is highly 
correlated, no matter which of the two deflators is used.  
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Significant differences in Member States’ 
intra-euro-area competitiveness performance 
The Panel B of Table 3 displays various measures 
of intra-euro-area competitiveness. For each 
Member State, measures of the real effective 
exchange rates are calculated relative to the other 
11 Member States rather than against the rest of 
the world.  
In general, the Member States with the highest 
losses of total international price and cost 
competitiveness (Panel A of Table 3) also 
registered the highest losses of intra-euro-area 
competitiveness (Panel B of Table 3), a major 
exception being Ireland. From the first quarter of 
2002 to the fourth quarter of 2004, Italy, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain saw the highest losses in both 
price and cost competitiveness, though in terms 
of price competitiveness the deterioration was 
less marked in Portugal.  
The Member States that experienced only limited 
deterioration in their international 
competitiveness saw an improvement of their 
intra-euro-area competitiveness. Price and cost 
competitiveness relative to the euro-area average 
improved markedly in Germany and Finland and 
to a much lesser extent in France. Austria and the 
Netherlands registered a slight improvement of 
their price competitiveness, mainly due to lower 
inflation, while Belgium/Luxembourg recorded a 
slight improvement of cost competitiveness. 
Competitiveness losses translated into a loss 
of market share  
Fluctuations in price or cost competitiveness are 
certainly not the only, nor necessarily the most 
significant, determinant of trade trends. 
However, there seems to be a strong correlation 
between cost competitiveness and the export 
performance (i.e. including intra- and extra-euro-
area trade – see Graph 15).7 Almost all euro-area 
Member States lost market shares between 2002 
                                                     
7  For each Member State, export performance is measured 
by an index of that country’s volume of total exports 
(intra- and extra-euro-area) divided by an index of the 
weighted sum of the volume of imports into its various 
destination markets. The weights correspond to the 
relative size of the destination markets in the country’s 
total exports. 
and 2004.8 Only Germany and Spain gained very 
slight market shares. In the case of Spain this is a 
surprising observation as the country has 
experienced one of the highest deteriorations of 
international competitiveness of all the euro-area 
Member States.  
Graph 15: Cumulative changes in export 
performance(1) (from 2002 to 2004) and in cost 
competitiveness (from Q1 2002 and Q4 2004) 
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(1) See Graph 1 for a definition of the export performance. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The two countries that registered the strongest 
losses of market share were Greece and Italy. 
The Irish case is a more complex one as the loss 
of market share remained limited despite a 
substantial deterioration of cost competitiveness. 
One possible explanation for this phenomenon 
could be that Irish exporters have squeezed their 
profit margins in order to keep the loss of market 
share limited.9  
                                                     
8  Market shares is  measured by “export performance”.  
9  Another possible explanation is that domestic price and 
cost deflators increased much faster than export prices, 
reflecting domestic cyclical developments which did not 
affect the export sector.  
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3. Recent developments in inflation  
Headline inflation remains above 2%... 
Headline consumer price inflation has proved to 
be quite volatile since the beginning of 2004. 
After a brief spell of deceleration during the first 
months of the year, it picked up markedly in the 
spring and then eased again slightly over the 
summer before rebounding from 2.1% in 
September to 2.4% in October. According to 
Eurostat’s Flash estimate, there was another 
deceleration in November, with year-on-year 
growth in HICP falling to 2.2%. These 
fluctuations can largely be traced back to base 
effects, to changes in crude oil prices and, to a 
lesser degree, changes in indirect taxation and 
administered prices.  
Graph 16: HICP inflation, euro area  
(y-o-y changes in %, Jan 2001 – Nov 2004) 
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(1) November are data based on Eurostat’s flash estimate and are 
only available for the HICP as a whole. 
Source: Commission services. 
… but underlying price pressures are 
relatively muted 
While headline inflation has remained above 2%, 
measures of core inflation suggest that 
underlying inflationary pressures have been 
relatively muted. Graph 16 displays two measures 
of core inflation in the euro area.  
A standard measure, the HICP excluding energy and 
unprocessed food, shows a slight acceleration of 
inflation during the first half of the year followed 
by a deceleration to 2% in September and 
October. However, since the beginning of 2004, 
this measure of core inflation has been affected 
by significant hikes in tobacco taxes in several 
Member States as well as increases in 
administered prices in the German health sector. 
It has therefore tended to overestimate 
underlying inflation trends.  
The graph also displays the so-called weighted 
median measure of inflation. The weighted median is 
constructed so as to avoid distortion by special 
temporary factors in specific sectors.10 Over the 
past few years, it has proven to be a good leading 
indicator of developments in core inflation. For 
instance, since 1996, turnarounds in inflation 
have been visible in the weighted median about 
4-5 months earlier than in the HICP excluding 
energy and unprocessed food. Weighted median 
inflation has been on a slow but steady 
deceleration path since March and now stands at 
1.6%, suggesting relatively muted underlying 
inflation pressures.  
High oil prices are taking their toll 
Due to a combination of supply and demand 
factors, oil prices have been on an upward trend 
during much of the year. The average monthly 
price of the Brent climbed to close to 50$ in 
October before easing again to 45$ in 
November. By mid-December the barrel of 
Brent was trading at about 40$. For euro-area 
users, the spike in oil prices has been somewhat 
cushioned by the appreciation of the euro but, 
even when taking this moderation effect into 
account, the price during the first half of 
December was still 25% higher than at the 
beginning of the year.  
Changes in oil prices tend to feed very rapidly 
into the energy component of the HICP which 
accounts for about 8% of the consumption 
basket used to calculate the HICP. Estimates 
suggest that a 10% increase in Brent prices in 
euro translates into an increase of HICP energy 
inflation of about 1.5-2% within a few months. 
As a result of higher oil prices and base effects 
linked to the Iraq war in 2003, year-on-year 
                                                     
10  It is calculated by ranging the price changes for the 
various consumption categories from the lowest to the 
highest (together with their weights in the consumption 
basket). The median inflation rate is the growth rate 
where the accumulated weight has reached 50%. 
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growth in the energy component of the HICP 
has accelerated sharply since the spring. It was 
running at close to 10% in October and, unless 
crude oil prices ease much further in the coming 
weeks, it will remain high during the first few 
months of 2005. 
Graph 17: Oil prices and energy inflation in the euro 
area (Jan 2001 to Nov 2004) 
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(1) Year-on-year changes in the energy component of the HICP 
(only available to October 2004). 
Source: Commission services. 
A rise in oil prices affects headline inflation 
directly via the HICP’s energy component but it 
also feeds into consumer prices indirectly via its 
impact on the production costs of the sectors 
using energy. Such spill-over effects are difficult 
to measure but there is some, albeit limited, 
evidence that some indirect pass-though is taking 
place. Since the spring, consumer prices have 
risen rapidly in transport services, where the 
pass-through of higher oil costs is generally 
relatively rapid. However, other consumption 
categories with a relatively high exposure to oil 
do not seem to have faced significant inflation 
pressures so far.11  
Likewise, evidence of indirect effects in producer 
price inflation remains limited. Producer prices 
have increased rapidly in the past few months 
but this was mainly the result of prices hikes in 
the energy and the intermediate good sectors. 
There have not, so far, been any visible signs of 
pass-through of higher energy costs into 
consumer good prices, with year-on-year 
inflation in the sector even registering a 
                                                     
11  For instance, inflation in the non-durable good sector 
decelerated in September and October. 
deceleration in September and October 
(Graph 18).  
Graph 18: Producer price inflation in the euro area  
(y-o-y changes in % – Jan 2001 to Oct 2004) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Two factors can explain the limited degree of 
indirect effects observed so far. First, it takes 
time for cost increases to be transmitted down 
the production chain. In this context, further 
indirect inflation pressures from oil prices are to 
be expected in the coming months. Second, 
some powerful disinflationary forces – essentially 
the appreciation of the euro and moderating unit 
labour costs – are also at play at the moment and 
have partly offset the impact of higher oil prices.  
The strong euro has helped contain oil 
related inflationary pressures…  
The appreciation of the euro is a significant force 
for disinflation in the euro area. As shown in 
Graph 19, there is a close link between 
developments in extra-euro-area import prices 
and the effective exchange rate. The appreciation 
of the euro since 2001 has translated into a 
significant – although much less than 
proportional – fall in the extra-euro-area import 
prices of consumption goods.12  
Empirical studies on the pass-through of 
exchange rate fluctuations show that, in the euro 
                                                     
12  As import price data in national account statistics cover 
both intra and extra-euro-area trade, the data in the graph 
are derived from trade statistics. These are generally 
released with a significant lag with latest import price data 
only available to June 2004.  
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area, the impact on import prices is relatively 
rapid, a conclusion which is also backed by 
Graph 19. The pass-through into consumer 
prices is, however, significantly slower with most 
of the effect occurring after an estimated lag of 
1.5 to 2 years.13 This suggests that the 
disinflationary effect of the appreciation of the 
euro registered in 2003 has not been fully felt yet. 
The renewed phase of appreciation into which 
the euro has entered since October will add 
further disinflationary pressures during the 
course of 2005.  
Graph 19: Imported disinflation, euro area  
(index 1999=100 – Jan 2001 to August 2004) 
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(1) Price index of imports of consumption goods.  
(2) Inverted scale. 
Source: Commission services. 
… and moderating labour costs have also 
played an important role  
Since the second half of 2003, developments in 
labour costs have been a major source of 
inflation moderation in the euro area. Year-on-
year growth in unit labour costs decelerated from 
2.4% in the second quarter of 2003 to 0.3% in 
the second quarter of 2004, its lowest rate since 
1999 (Graph 20). The sharp slowdown in labour 
costs follows a strong cyclical rebound in labour 
productivity. In year-on-year terms, growth in 
labour productivity stood at 1.9% in the second 
quarter of 2004, its best performance since the 
beginning of 2000. To a small extent, unit labour 
                                                     
13  See the “EU Economy: 2003 Review”, Chapter 1 for a 
review of some recent empirical studies on the pass-
through. Estimations of the extent of the pass-through 
into consumer prices still vary significantly with a range of 
2 to 16% in the studies reviewed.  
cost moderation is also the result of a slight 
deceleration of wage rates (as measured by the 
ratio of the total wage bill and the total number 
of employees). 
Graph 20: Unit labour costs, euro area  
(year-on-year changes in % –  2001Q1 to 2004Q2) 
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(1) Ratio of compens.  per employee to real GDP per employee.  
(2) Total compensation per employee.  
(3) Ratio of real GDP to total employment.  
Source: Commission services. 
The short-term outlook for inflation reflects 
these conflicting forces  
The short-term outlook for inflation is the result 
of conflicting forces. Headline inflation will 
remain above 2% during the first months of 
2005 due to persistent inflationary pressures 
from higher oil prices, including increasing 
indirect effects. However, in the absence of 
second-round wage effects or further hikes in oil 
prices, inflationary pressures due to higher oil 
prices will peter out and be gradually offset by 
downward pressures on prices stemming from 
the strong euro, moderate labour costs, persistent 
slack in the economy and favourable base effects 
related to increases in taxes and administered 
prices implemented in 2004.  
The Commission’s Autumn 2004 Forecasts 
projected a deceleration of inflation from 2.2% in 
the first quarter of 2005 to 1.8% in the second. 
Since the release of the forecast, oil prices have 
turned out to be somewhat less high and the 
euro exchange rate somewhat stronger than 
assumed in these projections. These 
developments may translate into slightly stronger 
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disinflation pressures in the first months of 2005 
than initially envisaged.  
Graph 21: Expected price changes in surveys,  
euro area (Jan 2001 to Nov 2004) 
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(1) Price trends over next 12 months. 
(2) Selling price expectations for the months ahead. 
Source: Commission services. 
This relatively benign assessment of the short-
term outlook for inflation is further backed by 
recent developments in inflation expectations. 
The ECB’s latest Survey of Professional 
Forecasters points to unchanged inflation 
expectations for 2005 – averaging 1.9% for the 
year as a whole, down from 2.1% in 2004 –  
According to ECFIN’s household survey, 
households’ assessment of price trends over the 
next 12 months has not changed significantly in 
the past few months (Graph 21). Selling price 
expectations in the manufacturing sector have 
responded more substantially to higher oil prices 
but the hike stems mostly from the intermediate 
goods sector. Producers of consumption goods 
have, so far, not reported any noticeable rise in 
their selling price expectations. 
4. Inflation differences within the euro 
area: an update 
Differences in inflation rates between EMU 
Member States can be a consequence of 
necessary price adjustments in the absence of 
exchange rate flexibility but they can also be a 
symptom of economic imbalances. The issue 
therefore deserves careful and regular 
monitoring. It was analysed in depth in the focus 
section of the Quarterly Report on the Euro 
Area No.4 2002. The present section provides an 
update, assessing the developments in inflation 
differences that have taken place in EMU in the 
past two years. 
Inflation differences between euro-area 
Member States have narrowed  
Graph 22 displays the standard deviation of 
inflation rates across euro-area Member Sates. 
After reaching a bottom in 1997-98, inflation 
dispersion within the euro area increased in the 
late 1990s. It remained relatively high in 2000-02 
– at least relative to the trough reached in 1997 – 
before narrowing again in 2003. Developments 
since the beginning of 2004 have been somewhat 
mixed. Inflation differences increased rapidly 
during the first half of the year, and then 
narrowed over the summer before widening 
again in October.  
Graph 22: HICP Inflation dispersion across euro-area 
countries (1) (in % – Jan 1996 to Oct 2004) 
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(1) Euro area data exclude Greece up to 2000.  
Source: Commission services. 
In 2004, measures of inflation dispersion in the 
euro area were distorted by changes in indirect 
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taxation and administered prices in several 
Member States. In particular, cuts in alcohol 
taxes in Finland entailed a substantial 
deceleration of inflation in that country and 
explain much of the observed widening of 
inflation differences within the euro area during 
the first half of 2004. This can be seen in 
Graph 22 which also shows the standard 
deviation of inflation rates for all Member States 
excluding Finland. In that case, significant 
inflation convergence can be observed 
throughout 2003 and until spring 2004. The 
convergence trend was reversed only modestly in 
the last few months of 2004 and stands in sharp 
contrast with the relatively high level of inflation 
dispersion observed in EMU over the 2000-02 
period.  
The inflation convergence process registered 
since the beginning of 2003 is broad-based and 
not just a reflection of favourable developments 
in just a few countries. This is particularly clear 
for 2003. Graph 23 shows that all Member States 
with above euro-area average inflation rates at 
the end of 2002 reported stronger than euro-area 
average disinflation in 2003 (top-left quadrant of 
the graph). Conversely, countries with below 
euro-area inflation reported an acceleration of 
inflation that year (bottom-right quadrant). With 
the exception of Finland no country is located in 
the remaining two quadrants for that year. 
Graph 23: A closer look at inflation convergence within 
the euro area in 2003 (1) (in %) 
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(1) Dotted lines denote euro-area averages.  
Source: Commission services. 
Nevertheless, the convergence trend is somewhat 
less clear in 2004 (Graph 24). Although a 
majority of countries are still located in the two 
‘convergence quadrants’ (top-left and bottom-
right) that year, four countries can now be found 
in the ‘divergence quadrants’ (Finland, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg).  
Graph 24: A closer look at inflation convergence within 
the euro area in 2004 (1) (in %) 
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(1) Dotted lines denote euro-area averages.  
Source: Commission services. 
The recent convergence in inflation was 
driven by a combination of three factors  
Three factors have dampened inflation 
divergence in the euro area in the last two years: 
the unwinding of some of the past price shocks, 
converging cyclical conditions and the 
appreciation of the euro. 
The unwinding of past price shocks. Price 
shocks in specific sectors such as food or energy 
can temporarily widen inflation differences, 
either because they are asymmetric (i.e. they 
affect some countries and not others) or because 
they have asymmetric transmission effects (they 
affect all countries but some countries are more 
exposed than others).  
An analysis of the contributions of individual 
consumption categories to total inflation 
dispersion in the euro area is presented in Box 4. 
It shows that some of the inflation convergence 
in 2003 can be ascribed to the energy sector, 
suggesting that the unwinding of the inflation 
divergences caused by the 2000 oil price shock 
was quite slow. In contrast, the food sector has 
made a lasting and substantial contribution to  
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Box 4: A sectoral view of inflation dispersion within the euro area 
 
HICP inflation data can be broken down into a large number of consumption categories ranging from food products 
to industrial goods and services. The analysis of the respective contributions of these categories to cross-country 
differences in the overall rate of headline inflation can shed some light on the nature of the inflation 
divergence/convergence process at work within the euro area.  
1. The methodology 
The contribution of consumption categories to the total dispersion of inflation rates across Member States is based 
on a simple decomposition of the variance.  
Total inflation in country i at time t can be proxied by the weighted sum of the inflation rates of individual 
consumption categories in this country: 
(1) πti = Σk αk Χ πtik = Σk ωtik   
     where ωtik is the contribution of consumption category k to total inflation in country i at time t.  
(2) VAR(πtEA) = COVAR(πtEA, πtEA) =  Σk COVAR(πtEA, ωtik) 
 
Based on equation (2), the contribution of each consumption category to total inflation variance across Member 
States can be calculated for each period of time. It depends on the cross-country variance of inflation in that 
consumption category, the category’s weight in the consumption basket and the degree to which cross-country 
inflation dispersion in that category follows the same pattern as inflation differences for the total HICP.  
2. The contributions to inflation dispersion of a few aggregate consumption categories 
This methodology has been applied to annual data for a decomposition of the HICP into a few broad consumption 
categories. The resulting sectoral contributions to the total cross-country variance in headline inflation are presented 
in the table below. The second column of the table displays the weight of the various consumption categories in total 
household consumption. The four subsequent columns present the contributions to inflation dispersion of the 
individual consumption categories for several recent years (1997 is added as it marks the low point for inflation 
differences in the euro area). The last two columns show the changes in contributions to inflation variance between 
1997 and 2002 (on the one hand) and 2002 and 2004 (on the other). This helps in assessing the sources of increased 
inflation dispersion in the late 1990s and reduced dispersion in 2003-04. 
 
Contribution of consumption categories to inflation dispersion within the euro area 
(inflation dispersion is measured by the variance of HICP inflation across the 12 Member States) 
 Weights (1) 1997 2002 2003 2004 (2) 1997-2002 2002-2004 
Non-energy indust. goods 31.0 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.08 -0.02 
   of which:        
      Durables 10.6 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.00 
      Semi-durables 12.4 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.03 
      Non-durables 8.0 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 
Energy 8.1 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.14 -0.09 
Food  19.5 -0.03 0.24 0.25 0.31 0.27 0.07 
   of which alcohol and      
tobacco. 
3.9 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.20 0.06 0.14 
Services  41.3 0.04 0.63 0.45 0.14 0.59 -0.49 
   of which:        
       Communication 2.9 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.04 
       Housing 10.4 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.05 
       Recreation 15.0 0.00 0.41 0.33 0.11 0.41 -0.30 
       Transport 6.4 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.02 
       Miscellaneous 6.6 0.00 0.13 0.09 -0.03 0.13 -0.16 
Total  100.0 0.09 1.17 0.84 0.64 1.08 -0.53 
(1) Weight in HICP consumption basket in 2004 in %. 
(2) Based on data for January to October. 
Source: Commission services. 
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3. Main lessons from the breakdown of the data 
Several interesting features emerge from the table:  
¾ Looking at the medium-term picture (for instance since 2000), the contribution of consumption categories to 
cross-country inflation variance within the euro area does not always reflect the weight of these categories in 
total private consumption. Hence, the food and energy prices sectors tend to make a more than proportional 
contribution to inflation dispersion. The opposite holds for non-energy industrial goods.  
¾ Service sectors also tend to play a more important role in inflation dispersion than what their weights in the 
consumption basket would suggest, specially the broad recreation and culture category (in particular services 
related to hotels and restaurants). However, it is important to note that this gap between contribution and 
weight in services is entirely attributable to Ireland where the discrepancy between developments in prices in 
the sheltered and open sectors have been much larger than in others countries.  
¾ Price shocks in the food and energy sectors explain around 40-50% of the increase in inflation differences in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, the rest being accounted for by non-energy industrial goods and services. When 
Ireland is included (as in the table above), the rise in inflation dispersion which is not attributable to food and 
energy prices essentially stems from the service sector. When Ireland is excluded, industry and services play 
broadly similar roles in the divergence trend.  
¾ Convergence is observable after 2002 as a result of a reduced contribution of services and, to a lesser degree, of 
the energy sector. If Ireland is excluded, the convergence trend already begins in 2002 with the energy, industry 
and service sectors playing similar roles. In any event, it is interesting to note a persistently large contribution of 
food prices to inflation differences in the euro area.  
 
Looking at recent developments in monthly data (not presented in the table above), two points should be stressed. 
The 2000 oil price shock was a source of inflation dispersion in the euro area in the early 2000s. Recent oil price surges 
have so far had a more muted impact on inflation dispersion but their contribution has increased since the summer. 
The contribution of the food sector has again increased since the beginning of 2004. This time, however, the increase can 
mostly be ascribed to alcohol and tobacco prices and reflects changes in indirect taxation rather than shocks in the 
fresh food sector as in the previous years.  
inflation differences in the past few years. In 
2003, the waning of the divergence effect of 
price shocks in the fresh food sector was offset 
by increased price differences in the alcohol and 
tobacco sector, mostly reflecting the impact of 
changes in indirect taxation on tobacco. In 2004, 
changes in duties on both alcohol and tobacco 
led to an increase in the contribution of the food 
sector to total inflation differences.  
Converging cyclical conditions. Differences in 
cyclical conditions across euro-area Member 
States have helped to foster inflation 
convergence in the euro area in 2003-04. As 
shown in Graph 25, most of the countries which 
posted above-euro-area-average inflation at the 
end of 2002 also suffered from an above euro-
area average deterioration in the output gap in 
2003-04 (top-left quadrant). By the same token, 
most countries with below-average inflation rates 
experienced milder cyclical losses in activity 
(bottom-right quadrant). The two major 
exceptions to this rule are Spain and Greece.  
Graph 25: Inflation differences and economic activity, 
euro-area Member States (1), (in %) 
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(1) Dotted lines denote euro-area averages.  
Source: Commission services. 
The strengthening of the euro. Due to 
differences in Member States’ trade openness, 
their geographical trade specialisation and the 
speed of the pass-through, changes in the 
external value of the euro may have a significant 
impact on inflation differences. A recent 
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empirical study has concluded that the euro 
depreciation played a substantial role in the 
widening of inflation differences in the euro area 
in the early years of EMU.14 The appreciation of 
the euro since 2002 may now have had the 
opposite effect. 
Graph 26: Changes in effective exchange rates, euro-
area Member States (in % – 2000Q4 to 2004Q3) 
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(1) Cumulative change in nominal effective exchange rate between 
2000Q4 and 2004Q3.  
(2) Same as in (1) but multiplied by the share of imports in GDP. 
Source: Commission services. 
However, there is only modest direct evidence of 
an inflation convergence effect due to the 
stronger euro in the past few years. Graph 26 
displays the cumulative appreciation of the 
nominal effective exchange rate in euro-area 
Member States since the beginning of 2001. To 
account for trade openness, the graph also 
displays the cumulative appreciation weighted by 
the share of imports in GDP. Some countries, 
such as Ireland and the Netherlands, were 
posting above-average inflation rates in the early 
2000s and have benefited from a comparatively 
stronger disinflation effect caused by the 
appreciation of the euro in the past three years. 
However, this is clearly not the case for several 
other countries with comparatively high inflation 
(Portugal and Spain). Conversely, several low 
inflation countries such as Germany and Finland 
have registered relatively strong imported 
disinflation over the period.  
                                                     
14  Honohan P. and P. Lane (2003) “Divergent inflation rates 
in EMU”, Economic Policy, October, pp 357-394. 
Some diverging forces have again been at 
play since the beginning of the year  
Overall, developments in inflation convergence 
in 2003-04 are encouraging, suggesting that the 
episode of divergence of the late 1990s was 
temporary . Nevertheless, some forces causing 
inflation divergence have again been at play since 
the beginning of 2004 and will need to be closely 
monitored in the months to come. The analysis 
presented in Box 4 indicates that sources of 
inflation divergence in 2004 can be essentially 
traced back to the food and energy sectors. They 
are a consequence of the renewed hikes in oil 
prices and of changes in indirect taxation in the 
alcohol and tobacco sectors. Their impact should 
therefore be largely temporary although past 
experience suggests that the effect of temporary 
price shocks on inflation differences may take 
some time to unwind. It must also be stressed 
that various forms of wage indexation schemes 
still exits in several Member States. Such schemes 
increase the size and the duration of the response 
of inflation to temporary shocks and therefore 
tend to aggravate inflation differentials within the 
euro area in case of higher oil or food prices.  
Finally, it is worth recalling that not all forms of 
inflation differences should be considered as a 
potential problem in a monetary union. To the 
extent that they reflect necessary changes in 
relative prices, inflation differences may in some 
cases be seen as a crucial part of a longer-term 
convergence process (as in the case of the 
catching-up of lower income countries) or a 
reflection of an adjustment to asymmetric 
shocks. The contribution of the Netherlands to 
inflation divergence in 2004 (see Graph 24) 
should be interpreted in the latter light: 
overheating there in the late 1990s has led to a 
serious deterioration in price competitiveness 
that will need several years of below euro-area- 
average inflation to restore equilibrium. 
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Focus 
II. Foreign direct investment in EMU 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has contributed to greater economic integration in the euro area. Despite pronounced 
consolidation of global FDI activity from 2001 onwards, the FDI flows of euro-area Member States have remained 
considerably above the level recorded prior to EMU. This is due in particular to relatively strong intra-area FDI activity, 
suggesting that the euro has given impetus to cross-border ownership and production in the euro area. In consequence, Member 
States’ business cycles should become more synchronous, similar to the effect from rising trade integration. There is no 
compelling evidence that extra-area FDI outflows could have caused the low level of domestic investment in recent years. Firms 
aim to increase their profitability through FDI and usually expansion abroad feeds back into domestic activity. The size of 
the economic benefits from an outflow of FDI also depends on the intensity of competition in product markets and on labour 
market flexibility because these two factors dictate that lower costs are passed-through to lower consumer prices and that the 
labour force can be re-allocated to alternative jobs, respectively. 
  
This focus section discusses trends in foreign 
direct investments (FDI) in the euro area and 
across Member States. The intention is (1) to 
analyse recent developments, asking whether 
they differ in structure compared to the late 
1990s; (2) to see whether EMU has spurred FDI 
activity in the euro area; and (3) to elaborate on 
the impact of FDI on the euro area’s economic 
performance, in particular in view of the 
persistent weakness of its domestic investment. 
1. The concept and motivation of FDI  
FDI can be defined as a cross-border capital 
transaction that is motivated by the objective of 
obtaining a lasting interest in a foreign enterprise. 
The existence of a long-term relationship and of 
a significant degree of influence on decision-
making in the enterprises are seen as criteria of a 
lasting interest, meaning the ownership of a share 
of at least 10% in the foreign enterprise in 
international accounting practice. FDIs could be 
either greenfield investments, i.e. new investment 
in the host country, or merger and acquisitions 
(M&A, also called brownfield investments). 
Box 5 gives an overview of certain 
methodological issues relating to FDI.  
FDIs implies the transfer of ownership and 
control rights, which has the potential to unleash 
efficiency gains in the firm concerned and 
technology spill over. These - beyond the pure 
financing dimension - additional channels 
through which FDI inflows can boost economic 
activity have increasingly attracted the attention 
of modern theories on economic growth. 
The lion’s share of FDI activity can be attributed 
to trans-national corporations (TNCs) for which 
the decision between exporting goods to a 
foreign country and producing goods in the 
target country is often a close one. Usually, 
exporting goods or services requires setting up 
foreign affiliates dealing with marketing and sales 
activity. Hence, trade activity implies a certain 
amount of market-seeking cross-border 
investment (horizontal FDI). Theory suggests 
that the decision also to locate some of the 
production abroad depends on the trade-off 
between the benefits from proximity to the 
market and the costs of giving up some 
economies of scale in production. 
A different motivation for FDI is cost-
minimisation by locating different stages of the 
production chain in different countries (vertical 
integration). This aims to draw advantage from 
cost advantages in the different economies. 
Obviously the effects on the country of origin 
are different between horizontal and vertical 
FDI.15 
Information on the world’s 100 largest trans-
national corporations (TNCs) in Table 4 shows 
that the euro area is well represented, with 42  
                                                     
15  A third form is the so-called diversifying FDI, which is 
driven by the motivation to reduce firm-specific risks by 
being active in different markets. 
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Box 5: Measurement issues 
 
FDI data is compiled in the balance of payments, where FDI represent an important component of the financial 
account. In this section, FDI data from three different sources is used and although the data series are broadly 
similar, they are not identical. (i) The UNCTAD data set contains annual data for most countries of the world but 
not for the euro-area aggregate net of intra-area flows. The series start in 1970 for FDI flows, 1980 for FDI stocks 
and 1987 for M&A. (ii) The ECB publishes data on extra-euro-area FDI flows and stocks. Data on flows is available 
from 1999 onwards on a monthly basis and decomposed into three sub-components, namely whether they are 
financed through equity capital, retained earnings or other forms of capital, which in practice mostly amounts to 
inter-company loans. (iii) Eurostat provides annual FDI flows for the Member States and a number of other 
countries. It provides a breakdown in the form of financing, sectors and partner country, which allows an analysis of 
bilateral flows. The data is not, however, complete and in some cases, when total FDI was not available, the sum of 
equity capital and other capital was used as a proxy. FDI stocks and income are also available in Eurostat and the 
ECB data, but not M&A.  
A general consensus emerged that the majority of FDI flows in the late 1990s were actually M&As rather than new 
investments. The share of M&A in FDI seems to have fallen considerably since 2001, both worldwide and in the 
euro area. However, different accounting practices between FDI and M&A prevent a precise breakdown of FDI into 
greenfield and brownfield investments.1 
FDI is an imperfect but so far the best available indicator for the internationalisation of production in terms of 
coverage, timeliness and international comparability of the data. A difference between both emerges for instance 
when an international company expands activity abroad but finances this with capital in the source country because 
this transaction is not counted as FDI. Another trend in the internationalisation of production that is not covered in 
FDI statistics is the spread of cross-border franchising contracts and other forms of intra-firm agreements.  
 
1 On these differences and trends in M&A activity, see DG ECFIN Mergers and Acquisitions note, October 2004, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/structural_policies/2004/ma1en.pdf. 
 
 Table 4: Key characteristics of trans-national 
corporations (1) (2002 – billions of USD and ‘000s of 
employees per TNC) 
 World  TOP 100 
Euro-area 
firms in TOP 
100 (42) 
Foreign assets 33.2 29.9 
Total assets 68.9 61.5 
Foreign sales 27.5 30.6 
Total sales 47.5 40.6 
Foreign employment 70.4 74.9 
Total employment 143.3 146.3 
Transnationality index (2) 0.52 0.58 
(1) The data refers to non-financial TNCs; variables on foreign 
activity are linked to the home country, not to the EU12. 
(2) The index is the average of foreign to domestic assets, foreign 
to domestic sales and foreign to domestic employment.  
Source: UNCTAD. 
firms in the top 100 TNCs. The average euro-
area firm in this sample has a larger share of 
foreign assets and sales than the average world 
firm, whereas the share of employment is about 
equal. The transnationality index calculated by 
UNCTAD, which is the average of foreign to 
domestic assets, foreign to domestic sales and 
foreign to domestic employment, suggests that a 
large share of the activity of these TNC is linked 
to the home basis. According to this index, euro-
area TNC’s are more international than those in 
other countries because of a higher share of 
foreign sales. However, this result is somewhat 
misleading as it reflects the high degree of 
regional economic integration in the euro area. 
This is not captured in the index which links the 
home base to the home country rather than the 
euro area. 
2. Global and euro-area trends in FDI  
In the 1990s, the world economy experienced a 
significant surge in economic integration. 
Between 1995 and 2000, world trade grew by 
more than 8% per annum on average in real 
terms and world FDI inflows grew by as much as 
25% per annum in real terms, well above the 
expansion of real world GDP of just above 3 % 
on average over the same period. The 
extraordinary pace of investment globalisation in 
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the late 1990s proved, however, to be 
unsustainable and has been followed by a 
pronounced consolidation of FDI flows from 
2001 onwards (Graph 27).  
Graph 27: Trends in world output, trade and FDI 
(constant prices – 1995 to 2003) 
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Source: IMF, UNCTAD, Commission services. 
 
Three main factors explain the sharp increase in 
global FDI flows observed in the 1990s: 
¾ In many countries, political and economic 
stability increased while the political attitude 
towards openness improved considerably. 
Barriers to trade and cross-border investment 
were considerably reduced and the number of 
regulatory changes favourable to FDI 
accelerated in the second half of the 1990s. 
Related measures like the EU single market 
programme encouraged the 
internationalisation of production whilst 
financial market integration, deregulation and 
liberalisation fostered the holding of foreign 
ownership rights.  
¾ Technical progress reduced the information 
and transaction costs relating to direct 
investment abroad and made it easier to 
manage internationally dispersed transactions. 
The observation that international investment 
flows increased much more strongly than 
world trade indicates that trans-national 
companies’ transaction costs of international 
ownership fell more strongly than their 
transaction and transportation costs of goods, 
suggesting that technical progress in ICT 
plays a crucial role in stimulating FDI.  
¾ The global equity price bubble of the late 
1990s facilitated the financing of FDI and in 
particular of cross-border M&A activity 
through equity issuance or equity exchange. 
Inflated equity prices also caused an artificial 
boost to FDI data because FDI often implies 
the acquisition of foreign equity. Thus, it is 
not surprising that the value of FDI 
transactions recorded in the balance of 
payments fell in tandem with equity prices 
after the bubble burst.  
A similar pattern of surging flows in the late 
1990s followed by strong consolidation is visible 
in data for the euro area and euro-area Member 
States, suggesting that the three factors which 
shaped global investment also strongly affected 
euro-area FDI flows. However, Graph 28 shows 
that the level of euro-area FDI in 2003 was 
comparable to the level reached in 1998/99 and 
well above the level recorded in earlier years. In 
other words, the decline in trans-national 
investment in the past few years has been more 
moderate at the euro area level than at the global 
level. This suggests a stronger underlying trend 
increase in euro-area FDI flows, a development 
which can largely be related to intra-area flows. 
In 2003, total euro-area FDI inflows were more 
than 3% of GDP compared to a level of extra-
area FDI inflows of slightly above 1%. 
Graph 28: Euro-area Member States’ FDI flows (1) 
(1995 to 2003) 
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(1) Average of FDI abroad and foreign FDI in the economy. 
(2) Data only available from 1997.  
Source: UNCTAD, ECB, Commission services. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 31 - 
Graph 29: Extra-euro-area FDI flows 
(1999Q1 to 2004Q3) 
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Source: ECB. 
 
The euro area as a whole has recorded a 
persistent net outflow of FDI. In particular, the 
first three years of EMU featured high FDI 
abroad, when net FDI outflows amounted to 
more than 100 billion euro in 1999 and 2001.16 
Since 2002, net flows have become more 
balanced, with the magnitude declining by 2003 
to less than 5% of their peak in 2001. Both 
foreign direct investment outside the euro area 
and foreign investment by non-residents in the 
euro area have decreased considerably since then, 
shrinking by 2003 to ¼ of their peak level in 
2000.  
Graph 30: Euro-area foreign direct investment position, 
stocks in % of GDP 
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16  Economic interpretation of the FDI data is complicated 
by the occurrence of M&A transactions, of which some 
were so large that they dominate the data and give rise to 
considerable volatility in the time series. 
The resulting euro-area investment position rose 
to above 25% of GDP for both FDI assets and 
liabilities (see Graph 30). The area’s net foreign 
direct investment position reached 410 billion 
euro at the end of 2002, equivalent to 6% of 
GDP, and declined to 80 billion euro at the end 
of 2003.  
Despite the background of lower equity prices, 
the financing structure of euro-area FDI has in 
the meantime moved towards a larger share of 
equity financing in both investment abroad and 
in the euro area. Graph 31 shows that in 
particular the share of financing through other 
capital, which in practice means through inter-
company loans, is smaller in 2002-2004 than in 
1999-2003 whereas the share of reinvested 
earnings has increased but remains small.  
Graph 31: Structure of euro-area FDI 
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(1) 2004 is data until September. Inflows (+) and Outflows (-). 
Source: ECB. 
 
3 Has EMU spurred FDI activity?  
A number of theoretical arguments suggest that 
EMU could have fostered FDI. The elimination 
of both transaction costs relating to exchange 
rates and of nominal exchange rate volatility 
among Member States is a prominent factor that 
influences both trade and cross-border 
investment decisions. Economic theory, 
however, is ambiguous about the sign of the 
effect because trade and FDI can be substitutes. 
On the one hand, lower exchange rate volatility 
reduces the risk of producing export goods at 
home compared to producing them abroad. 
Thus, it could lead to a reduction in FDI. On the 
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other hand, the uncertainty caused by exchange 
rate volatility has a negative effect on investment 
in the presence of sunk costs. A second set of 
determinants is related to policy measures that 
aim at economic integration through reducing 
transaction costs. Firms are able to tap a larger 
market though cross-border sales or investment 
(market-size effect). Pressure to exploit these 
opportunities is likely to be stronger the more 
intensive the competitive pressure from other 
enterprises and the more production relies on 
economies of scale. Finally, harmonisation of 
regulation reduces information costs, which is 
seen as a further important determinant of cross-
border investment.17 
Available empirical research tends to confirm the 
importance of these determinants. Among them, 
the positive impact of both lower exchange rate-
related transaction costs and exchange rate 
volatility on cross-border investment seems to be 
the more doubtful explanation although some 
recent papers find evidence in favour of this 
effect.18 The size of the market, as proxied by the 
level of GDP, usually turns out to be significant 
in empirical estimates and even the modelling of 
information asymmetries as a determinant of the 
extent of cross-border equity holdings yield the 
expected results.19 
                                                     
17  See, for example, Lane, P. and G.M. Milesi-Ferretti 
(2004), “International investment patterns”, IMF 
Working Paper 04/134. Mody, A. et al. (2003), “The role 
of information in driving FDI flows”, NBER Working 
Paper No 9662. 
18 See, for instance Wei, S.-J. and C. Choi (2004), “Currency 
blocks and cross-border investment”, unpublished IMF 
Working Paper and Bénassy-Quéré, A. et al. (1999), 
“Exchange rate strategies in the competition for attracting 
FDI”, CEPII document de travail No 99-16, who found 
that low exchange rate variability fosters FDI. Sekkat, K. 
and O. Galgau (2002), “The impact of the single market 
on FDI in the EU”, mimeo, Université Libre de Bruxelles 
find a significant effect of short-term volatility on FDI in 
only a few manufacturing sectors (petroleum, rubber, 
chemical and plastic products) but not for manufacturing 
or services as a whole. 
19  Market size was identified as having a stronger impact on 
FDI than on trade in goods in Nicoletti, G. et al. (2003), 
“Policies and international integration: influences on trade 
and FDI”, OECD Economics Department Working 
Paper No 259. For the second effect, see Mody, A. et al. 
(2003). 
Regional integration has been a major driver of 
FDI in the EU in the 1990s, which is fully 
consistent with both theoretical conjecture and 
empirical evidence. Graph 32 shows that FDI 
activity, here measured as the average of inflows 
and outflows relative to GDP, was similar in 
both the euro area and the world economy until 
the late 1980s.  
Graph 32: Euro area and world FDI intensity (1) 
(1970 to 2003) 
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(1) FDI intensity as measured by the average of FDI abroad and 
foreign FDI in the economy. Euro area Member States includes 
intra-area flows. 
Source: UNCTAD, ECB, Commission services. 
 
The timing of differences between both series 
seems to be linked to the single market 
programme and EMU. For example, FDI 
intensity in the euro area outpaced activity in the 
rest of the world after the launch of the single 
market programme. A wider wedge between 
both series emerged in the run-up to EMU. 
Euro-area FDI flows increased to 8% of GDP in 
2000 from 1.5% in 1996. This compares with an 
increase from 1.2% in 1996 to 3% of GDP in 
2000 for the rest of the world. The difference 
between the aggregate including intra-area flows 
and extra-area flows suggests that the upsurge 
until 2000 was strongly driven by extra-area 
flows, in particular by a number of large-scale 
M&As. 
The gap in the world and euro-area FDI/GDP 
ratio narrowed after 2000, though much less so if 
the aggregate of the euro-area Member States is 
looked at rather than the euro area as a whole. 
The reason is the still high level of intra-area FDI 
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flows, which ties in with the finding that EMU 
stimulated intra-area trade in particular.20 
Graph 33: Cross-border investment position and trade 
openness (1) (average 1999-2002) 
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(1) Average of external assets and liabilities for the investment 
position and of inflows and outflows for trade openness. BLEU is 
joint data for Belgium and Luxembourg.  
Source: Commission services, UNCTAD. 
 
Because of the notion of trade as being a strong 
motivation for firms to conduct FDI and the 
similarity of the determinants of trade and cross-
border investment in the literature, a broadly 
comparable ranking of countries in both forms 
of openness might be expected. Graph 33 shows 
that this is approximately the case for the euro-
area Member States on average for 1999-2002, 
with two major outliers. Austria has a smaller 
international investment stock than its degree of 
trade openness suggests whereas the reverse 
holds true for Spain.  
Graph 34 suggests that the increase in both trade 
and FDI intensity over 1995-98 and 1999-2002 is 
strongly correlated in a sample of European and 
other economies. The trend-line is upward 
sloping and the R2 indicates that almost 50% of 
the variation in the increase in FDI-integration is 
explained by the increase in trade openness. 
Thus, if EMU stimulated trade in the euro area, 
as suggested by a number of empirical papers, it 
would follow that it also stimulated cross-border 
investment. Comparing the position of the dots 
reveals that the increase in both dimensions of 
openness was higher in euro-area Member States 
                                                     
20 See Quarterly Report on the Euro Area No.3 2003. 
than in other European and non-European 
economies.  
Graph 34: Change in FDI and trade openness (1) 
(1995-1998 versus 1999-2002)  
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(1) FDI and trade openness are averages of inflows and outflows. 
Euro area excl.uding BLEU and EL. The pink dots are the other 
EU Member States (excl. HU), US, JP, NO, RO, BG and TR. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Whether the increase in FDI is related to EMU 
or a lagged effect of the single market is difficult 
to detect in a comparison of trends in the euro 
area with those three EU-15 countries that have 
not adopted the euro. Graph 35 shows the 
FDI/GDP ratio for the 4-year periods 1995-98 
and 1999-2002 for the euro area and the UK.  
 
Graph 35: FDI flows in the euro area (1) and the UK 
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(1) Euro area excluding EL and IE. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table 5: Empirical estimates of the EMU effect on FDI 
 Data Method Results 
Petroulas (2004) 
Bilateral inward FDI, 18 
OECD countries, 1992-
2001 
Panel estimation with EMU dummies, control 
with IV estimate; control for GDP, stock 
market value, real exchange rate, complex 
common time trend 
Euro raised intra-area FDI 
by 17% and by only 9-
12% to and from non-
Member countries 
Manchin (2004) 
Acquisition of majority 
shareholdings 1991-2001, 
EU-15, USA, CN, NO, 
CH, 
Panel regression with fixed effects, EU and 
EMU dummies; control for GDP per capita, 
population, distance, stock market 
capitalisation, legal system, public activity 
No evidence of more 
intense M&A activity 
(number and value) 
between euro-area 
Member States 
Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
(2004) 
60 countries 1995-2002, 
FDI inflows 
Time series panel regression, control for GDP, 
business environment, distance, wages, 
geographical, EU and EMU dummies 
EMU raised annual FDI 
inflows by more than a 
third. 
De Sousa/Lochard 
(2004a) 
23 OECD countries 
1982-2002, outward 
bilateral FDI stocks 
Panel estimation with fixed effects, control for 
GDP, exchange rate volatility and labour 
market characteristics, EMU dummy 
Euro raised intra FDI 
flows by 42% compared 
to FDI among non-EMU 
countries.  
De Sousa/Lochard 
(2004b) 
22 OECD countries, 
1982-2002, bilateral trade, 
FDI outward stock 
Gravity model for trade with bilateral FDI as 
independent variable, OLS, IV and fixed-
effects estimations; control for GDP, distance, 
exchange rate volatility, FTA, EU and EMU 
dummies 
Half of the increase in 
trade in EMU stems from 
an increase in FDI 
Note: The effect of EMU on trade is estimated to vary between 5-50%, depending on the study considered. See Quarterly Report on the Euro 
area No.3 2003 for a discussion.  
Sources: Petroulas, P. (2004), The effect of the Euro on foreign direct investment”, Mimeo, University of Stockholm. Manchin, M. (2004), 
“Determinants of European cross-border mergers and acquisitions”, European Commission DG ECFIN Economic Papers No 212. Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2004), “World investment prospects 2004: The revival of globalisation?”, EIU London. De Sousa, J. and J. Lochard (2004a), 
“Does the single currency affect FDI?”, Mimeo, University of Paris I and University of Rennes. De Sousa, J. and J. Lochard (2004b), “The 
currency union effect on trade and the FD channel”, Mimeo, University of Paris I and University of Rennes. 
It is evident that FDI activity was much higher in 
the UK in the first period while FDI penetration 
was about equal in both economic entities in the 
second period, possibly meaning that the euro 
has allowed the euro area to catch up to the 
initially higher UK level.21 Sweden and Denmark, 
the other two “out” countries, witnessed a 
development similar to the one in the euro area. 
Formal tests of whether EMU has had an effect 
on FDI flows are similar to those applied on the 
trade effect, i.e. the usual determinants of 
trade/FDI are run on bilateral trade/FDI flows 
to see whether an EMU dummy is significant. 
Although this kind of research has only been 
recently addressed by academics (see Table 5), 
first results suggest that EMU exerted a positive 
effect on FDI if the estimate controls for other 
                                                     
21 Interpreting the data is complicated by a single large-scale 
M&A transaction (Vodaphone/Mannesmann) between 
the UK and the euro area that inflates euro-area inflows 
from non-euro-area countries and UK outflows into the 
euro area in the second period. 
determinants, for instance the effect of the single 
market (EU dummies in Table 5). 
A further focus of recent empirical research has 
been on FDI and international business cycle co-
movement. Jansen and Stokman (2004) find that 
countries with comparatively intensive FDI 
relations also have more synchronised business 
cycles. Furthermore, FDI is associated with the 
vulnerability to foreign output spill over that 
occurs with a lag, while international trade has 
immediate effects. Trade linkages quickly 
transmit a shock between economies and then 
shut down, i.e. stop transmitting, whereas the 
FDI channel implies a lasting effect for up to half 
a year.22  
                                                     
22  Jansen W.J. and C.J. Stockman (2004), “FDI and 
International Business Cycle Comovement”, De 
Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam. 
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4. Did outward FDI divert investment 
from the euro area?  
The net outflow of FDI from the euro area 
suggests that the representative trans-national 
corporation expects higher returns from its 
activity abroad than from investment in the euro 
area. It also means the absorption of domestic 
savings, which could have been used for 
domestic investment. This section elaborates on 
the impact of FDI abroad on the home region. 
The effect crucially depends on two factors: the 
motivation behind FDI and - especially in the 
case of vertically-integrated FDI - the 
functioning of adjustment processes in the home 
economy. 
Since 1999, the euro area has invested about 
1400 billion euro abroad, which is 17% on 
average of the domestic investment registered 
between 1999 and the first half of 2004. Such a 
comparison, however, does not take into account 
that the euro area also received FDI from 
abroad. The net FDI outflow amounted to just 
330 billion euro, i.e. 4.5% of investment 
However, there is a conceptual difference 
between gross fixed capital formation 
(investment) and FDI because the latter 
comprises both greenfield investment and M&A. 
FDI inflows in M&A lead to a transfer of 
ownership rights but not to an increase in the 
euro-area capital stock. If 50% of the net FDI 
inflows were in M&A, the net capital outflow of 
savings, i.e. net of FDI inflows in greenfield 
investment, would be equal to about 11% of 
domestic investment per annum. 
The 17% of investment of FDI abroad therefore 
represents a biased figure. It could only be 
considered a measure of the maximum amount 
available for additional domestic investment. The 
figure of 4.5%, on the other hand, is a lower 
bound (assuming that FDI inflows are all 
greenfield investment or that M&A inflows free 
domestic savings that are transformed into 
domestic investment).  
Graph 36 suggests that the argument of 
investment-diverting FDI is flawed. FDI 
outflows from the euro area – absolute and in net 
terms – were high during the boom period 1999-
2000 when investment was also buoyant. Since 
2001, outward FDI flows have moderated and 
the investment share has come down. This 
observation provides support for the overall 
belief that FDI activity is pro-cyclical, being high 
in a buoyant economic environment with high 
domestic investment and vice versa. Thus, FDI 
abroad and capital formation seem to be 
complements rather than substitutes. 
Graph 36: Investment and FDI (1), euro area 
(1999Q1 to 2004Q2) 
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(1) (-) indicates a capital outflow. 
Source: ECB, Commission services. 
 
 
Graph 37: Net FDI and the change in domestic gross 
fixed capital formation, euro area (1999 to 2004) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 37 compares the net outflow of FDI from 
the euro-area Member States with the 
deterioration in the countries’ investment share 
between 1999 and 2004.23 It does not allow the 
conclusion that higher net outflows mean a 
stronger decline in the investment share. Rather 
                                                     
23 There is no systematic relationship between net FDI 
outflows and the level of investment. 
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the opposite seems to be true. France is the 
country with the highest FDI outflow relative to 
GDP in 1999-2004. A relatively small drop was 
recorded in its investment share whereas in 
Germany the investment share deteriorated 
considerably despite net FDI inflows. 
Apparently, the overall impact of outward 
investment on domestic activity depends on the 
objective behind investment abroad. Horizontal 
FDI achieves better access to foreign markets 
and stimulates trade with the target country. The 
effects for the source country of vertical FDI, 
characterised by the re-location of parts of the 
value chain, are more complex, implying benefits 
in terms of lower costs and higher profitability, 
which need to be balanced against the reduction 
in domestic employment (see Box 6). It is the 
latter effect in particular that often dominates 
headlines in economic news. 
Graph 38: Euro-area FDI outflows by target region,(1) 
(average 1999-2002) 
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(1) Excluding reinvested earnings for BLEU, EL, ES. 
Source: Commission services. 
To what extent is FDI driven by lower costs in 
the target countries? As Graph 38 demonstrates, 
most of the euro-area FDI abroad flows to other 
industrial countries. According to the still 
provisional 2003 data, two thirds of all FDI 
outflows remained in the EU-15. Only about 
22% was invested outside the EU-15, North 
America and Japan, and could be assumed of 
being driven by considerations of taking 
advantage of low labour costs.  
The share of FDI going to North America has 
approximately halved since the economic boom 
of 1999-2000 when a fifth of all FDI from euro-
area countries targeted North America. The 
decline in the share of FDI flowing in particular 
to the USA seems to have been absorbed entirely 
by a higher share of intra-area FDI. According to 
the data available so far, neither the share of FDI 
flowing to the new Member States nor to Eastern 
Asia or the rest of the world was higher in 
2001/02 than in the period 1998-2000.24 
Among intra-area FDI flows, the Southern 
European countries are not among the major 
recipients of FDI. The largest share of intra-area 
FDI was invested in 1999-2002 in Germany, 
BLEU, France and the Netherlands. This 
suggests that domestic market size and distance 
to big markets have been a more important 
determinant of FDI flows than differences in 
labour costs. 
Graph 39: Targets of intra-area flows  
(average 1999-2002) 
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(1) Excluding reinvested earnings. 
(2) average 2000-01.  
(3) average 2001-02. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
5  Policy implications  
The macroeconomic consequence of high cross-
border investment activity is a stronger 
relationship of economic activity across borders 
and in particular among euro-area Member 
States. As euro-area trans-national corporations 
earn a higher share of profits abroad, they are 
                                                     
24  The 2003 data is still provisional and incomplete. It points 
to a US share of 9% of all euro-area FDI abroad. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 37 - 
Box 6: The benefits from outsourcing for the source country 
 
Though the benefits from FDI are similar to those of trade, little quantitative analysis is available on the benefits for 
the source country (on the impact on the host country, see Box 2). Empirical work established that job losses due to 
FDI are small compared to changes in total employment (see Bernanke 2004 for the USA and Konings 2004 for the 
EU). However, this should not neglect the fact that it entails hardship for the workers concerned from the off-
shoring of production. 
 
Table : The distribution of income generated by 
1 USD spent on a service job in India in US cent 
 Host Source 
Wages paid to local workers, 
profits of local agents, local 
taxes 
33  
Corporate savings  58 
Additional exports to source 
countries as input for the 
services  5 
Repatriated earnings  4 
Sum of direct benefits 33 67 
Redeployed labour  45-47 
Sum of total benefits 33 112-114 
Source: Baily/Farrell (2004). 
 
In a recent contribution for an international consultancy 
agency, Bailey and Farrell give an intriguing illustration of 
how the benefit from relocating a service job from the 
USA to India is distributed among the source and the 
host country.  They calculate that India captures 33% of 
the corporate spending, benefiting from local wages etc. 
The direct benefits accruing for the source countries in 
the form of corporate savings, additional exports and 
repatriated earnings are twice as high. Under perfect 
competition, the company would be forced to fully pass-
through its cost savings to lower prices, implying that it is 
the consumer who benefits most from the investment 
abroad. A further benefit for the source economy accrues 
in the form of redeployed labour. The authors quote 
estimates for the USA according to which the workers set 
free through off-shoring move to another job and this 
reallocation of jobs adds value of 45-47 cent for every US 
dollar invested in Indian services. 
 
This example gives an illustration of the different effects involved. It also highlights two factors that are crucial for 
the source country to draw maximum benefits from investment abroad. Product market competition must be 
sufficiently intense so that consumer prices decline and consumers benefit. And labour markets need to be adaptable 
in order to prevent the redundant labour force in the domestic economy from becoming unemployed. On both 
accounts the euro area compares unfavourably with the USA, implying less economic benefits from FDI than on the 
other side of the Atlantic. 
Reference:  
Bernanke, B.S. (2004). ‘Trade and Jobs’, Remark at the Distinguished Speaker Series, Fuqua School of Business, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040330/default.htm.  
Konings, J. (2004), “The employment effects of foreign direct investment”, EIB Papers, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 87-108. 
 
Baily, M.N. and D. Farrell (2004), “Exploding the myths of offshoring”, McKinsey Quarterly, July, 
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com. 
more exposed to fluctuations inactivity and 
prices in the host countries. Returns from 
investment abroad represent a larger share of 
consumer and corporate income, implying that 
cross-border capital flows have become a more 
important channel for the international 
transmission of shocks than in the past decade.  
This means that, all things being equal, business 
cycles tend to become more alike across borders. 
While this makes the euro area more vulnerable 
to global shocks, it also gives rise to benefits 
from international risk-sharing, entailing a 
smoothing of shocks. Since FDI flows have 
intensified in particular within the euro area, 
these mechanisms foster more synchronised 
business cycles among Member States than prior 
to EMU. 
FDI is often a precondition for access to foreign 
markets. In general, foreign direct investment 
ensures a more efficient allocation of factors on a 
global scale, making more and cheaper products 
available for consumption. In order to fully 
harvest the microeconomic benefits from FDI, 
product market competition, flexible labour 
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markets and efficient financial markets are 
crucial.  
¾ Consumers benefit more the more 
competition enforces the pass-though of 
lower costs into lower consumer prices. Euro-
area companies need to be sufficiently 
competitive and able to adapt to structural 
change.25 
¾ The globalisation of production inevitably 
leads to industrial restructuring. Although job 
losses in the industries concerned are small 
compared to aggregate employment, they 
cause severe costs for the individuals hit. 
Designing adjustment policies that help 
displaced workers in the short term and 
promote strong investment in human capital 
and efficient skill-matching mechanisms 
would be an important means of accruing the 
maximum benefit from FDI.26  
¾ To fully exploit the beneficial effect of the 
single currency on FDI, Member States may 
have to address the remaining hindrances on 
the foreign acquisition of companies. 
 
                                                     
25  See European Commission (2004), “Fostering structural 
change: an industrial policy for an enlarged Europe“, 
COM(2004)274. 
26  See Chapter 5 in European Commission (2004) 
“Employment in Europe report 2004”, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employ
ment_analysis/employ_2004_en.htm.  
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IV. Key indicators for the euro area 
1 Output 2001 2002 2003* Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -10 -12 -11 -4 -4 -4 -3 -3 -3
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 0.2 -0.9 0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.6 0.5 
  2001 2002 2003* 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.3
2 Private consumption 2001 2002 2003* Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -6 -11 -18 -14 -14 -14 -13 -14 -13
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.3 1.3 0.1 1.9 -0.2 0.8 0.1 
  2001 2002 2003* 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 
 Private consumption 2.3 Qtr. % ch 1.9 0.6 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.2 
3 Investment 2001 2002 2003* 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 83.5 81.2 80.7 80.3 80.9 80.5 80.6 81.4 81.7 
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch -0.3 -2.7 -0.4 0.1 1.0 -0.3 0.3 0.6  
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.8  
4 Labour market 2001 2002 2003* Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.0 8.4 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9  
   2001 2002 2003* 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 1.4 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1   
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 7.8 3.8  2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0   
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.2    
5 International transactions  2001 2002 2003* Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -14 -22 -24 -11 -8 -9 -10 -10 -11 
 Exports of goods 5.2 Bn. EUR 767.4 776.9 1038.6 100.0 100.7 85.7 97.5   
 Imports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 802.2 781.6 970.4 91.1 87.9 82.7 94.4   
 Trade balance 5.4 Bn. EUR -34.8 -4.7 68.2 9.0 12.8 3.0 3.1   
   2001 2002 2003* 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 
 Exports of goods and services 5.5 Qtr. % ch 3.4 1.7 0.2 2.6 0.3 1.5 3.1 1.2  
 Imports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 2.1 -1.6 2.1 1.3 2.0 0.5 2.8 3.2  
   2001 2002 2003* Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04
 Current account balance 5.7 Bn. EUR -12.3 9.6  3.0 0.4 0.5 -3.2   
 Direct investment (net) 5.8 Bn. EUR -104.6 -90.4  -13.8 -8.5 9.3 5.3   
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR 36.5 38.0  31.7 -30.7 6.3 39.6   
6 Prices  2001 2002 2003* Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.2 
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 1.9 2.5 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.0  
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 2.2 1.7 1.6 2.4 2.9 3.1 3.3 4.0  
 Import prices 6.4 Ann. % ch 102.2 102.4 102.5       
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2001 2002 2003* Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 4.3 3.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 5.0 4.8 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.8 
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 4047 3053 2420 2791 2730 2647 2749 2794 2883 
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 5.3 5.6 7.8 5.2 5.4 5.7 5.8   
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 7.9 7.7 5.0 6.0 6.2 6.0 6.3 6.6  
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 0.90 0.95 1.13 1.21 1.23 1.22 1.22 1.25 1.30 
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 91.5 95.1 106.4 108.4 108.9 108.9 109.6 110.8 112.3 
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.3 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.4 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.5 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.6 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions; before 1997 partly estimated ECB 
5.8 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions ECB 
5.9 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Datastream
7.2 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Datastream
7.3 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Datastream
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Datastream
7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
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7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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